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CHAPTER 13 
Insurance Law 
JAMES J. MORAN, JR. 
ALAN M. REISCH* 
§ 13.1. "Motor Vehicle Liability" Exclusion in Homeowners Policy -
Severability of Interests- Additional Insured- Homeowners' Negligent 
Supervision of Minor's Driving. In Worcester Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Richard J. Marnell, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the motor 
vehicle exclusion2 in a homeowners insurance policy, when considered 
in light of the policy's severability of interest clause,3 did not eliminate 
coverage for the named insureds against allegations that they had negli-
gently supervised a party at their horne at which their son (an unnamed 
"additional insured" under the policy) became intoxicated, left the party 
in his automobile, and negligently killed another person.4 Therefore, the 
Court held that Worcester Mutual had a duty to defend the insured 
homeowners against the ensuing wrongful death action.5 
The wrongful death complaint alleged that Richard and Ellen Mamells' 
negligent supervision of a party at their horne was the proximate cause 
of the death of Robert J. Alioto. 6 The complaint further alleged that the 
Mamells knew or should have known that their son Michael was under 
§ 13.1 *James J. Moran Jr. and Alan M. Reisch are partners with the Boston Jaw firm 
of Morrison, Mahoney & Miller. Mr. Moran is a chartered property-casualty underwriter 
(CPCU). 
1 398 Mass. 240, 496 N.E.2d 158 (1986). Besides Richard J. Marnell, the defendants were 
Ellen Marnell, Michael J. Marnell, and William J. Alioto, administrator of the estate of 
Robert J. Alioto. Jd. at 240 n.l, 496 N.E.2d at 158 n.l. 
2 Id. at 242, 496 N.E.2d at 159. 
3 Jd. 
4 Jd. at 245-46, 4% N.E.2d at 161. Summary judgment was ultimately entered in favor 
of homeowners, Richard and Ellen Marnell, in the underlying tort action, Civil Action No. 
138800 (Norfolk County Superior Court). 
'Marnell, 398 Mass. at 245-56, 496 N.E.2d at 161. In Massachusetts an insurer has a 
duty to defend the insured for the underlying tort action not only when the plaintiff in that 
action alleges facts in the complaint which give rise to the coverage, but the duty also 
arises when facts are known or readily knowable to the insurer. Desrosiers v. Royal Ins. 
Co., 393 Mass. 37, 40, 468 N.E.2d 625, 628 (citing Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 
Ct. 163, 167, 450 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1983)). 
6 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 241, 496 N.E.2d at 159. 
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statutory legal age to consume alcohol' at the party;8 that the Marnells 
knew or should have known Michael would use his automobile to drive 
several guests home;9 and that Michael became intoxicated at the party, 
left in his car, and struck and killed Robert J. Alioto. 10 The Marnells 
notified Worcester Mutual of the Alioto's cause of action. 11 Worcester 
Mutual advised Richard and Ellen Marnell that it would defend them 
against the wrongful death suit, but only under a reservation of Worcester 
Mutual's rights because it appeared to the company that coverage did 
not exist under the Marnells' homeowners policy. 12 Worcester Mutual 
subsequently commenced the instant declaratory judgment action to de-
termine the scope of its indemnity and defense obligations. 13 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the superior court had properly 
determined that Richard and Ellen Marnell were named insureds, and 
that their son Michael, as a minor relative who resided in the Marnell 
household, was an unnamed "additional insured" under the Worcester 
Mutual policy. 14 Second, the Court agreed with the superior court that 
Michael Marnell was the "owner" and "operator" of the motor vehicle 
involved in the underlying death action. 15 In light of these facts, the 
Marnell Court observed that the provisions of the homeowners policy 
entitled "liability coverages,"16 "motor vehicle exclusion,"17 and "sever-
7 /d. See G.L. c. 138, § 34 (legal drinking age in Massachusetts is again 21 years). Cf. 
G.L. c. 23, § 85P and G.L. c. 4, § 7 cl. Forty-eighth to Fifty-first (eighteen is the age of 
majority in Massachusetts, and an "adult" is defined as a person who has obtained eighteen 
years of age). It is uncertain how this impacts a parent's right or ability to control unlawful 
drinking by adult offspring. 
8 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 241, 496 N.E.2d at 159. 
9Jd. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. at 241-42, 496 N.E.2d at 159. Worcester Mutual took the position that coverage 
was unavailable to the Marnells because of the policy's motor vehicle exclusion, which 
Worcester Mutual believed applied to all insureds notwithstanding the policy's severability 
of insurance clause. /d. at 242, 496 N .E.2d at !59; see infra notes 20-22 and accompanying 
text. 
13 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 242, 498 N.E.2d at 159. 
14Jd. 
"/d. 
16 See id. The insuring agreement of section II, the "Liability Coverages" section of the 
standard homeowners policy, as promulgated and filed by Insurance Services Office, Inc. 
with the Insurance Commissioner and as used by insurers in Massachusetts for the past 
decade, provides: 
/d. 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damage to which this 
coverage applies, we will: a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for 
which the insured is legally liable; and b. provide a defense at our expense by 
counsel of our choice . . . . 
17 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 242, 498 N.E.2d at 159. The "motor vehicle exclusion" provides 
that the "[liability coverages] do not apply to bodily injury or property damage ... arising 
2
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ability of insurance," 18 were pertinent in determining Worcester Mutual's 
duty to defend Richard and Ellen Marnell. 19 
Worcester Mutual argued that the severability of insurance clause did 
not affect the application of the motor vehicle exclusion of the home-
owners policy, which specifically precluded coverage for bodily injuries 
"arising out of the use . . . of a . . . motor vehicle owned and operated 
by ... any insured. "20 Because Michael Marnell was an insured under 
the policy, Worcester Mutual asserted that Richard and Ellen Marnell 
were not covered against the death claim because the motor vehicle 
exclusion specifically excepted coverage arising from operation by "any 
insured. "21 Additionally, Worcester Mutual argued that the language of 
the motor vehicle exclusion was clear and unambiguous and expressed 
the "clear underwriting objective to place automobile accidents beyond 
the coverage afforded by a homeowner's policy."22 The Court, however, 
determined that the meaning of the motor vehicle exclusion must be 
construed in conjunction with the severability of insurance clause, rather 
than alone as Worcester Mutual urged. 23 
In Marnell, the Court concluded that the severability of insurance 
clause in section II of the homeowners policy had the effect of separately 
extending liability coverage to each insured.24 Analyzed in that way, it 
was significant that the automobile was "owned" and "operated" by 
Michael at the time of the accident. 25 The Court concluded that the policy 
afforded coverage and that Worcester Mutual had a duty to defend Rich-
ard and Ellen Marnell because the injury alleged in the underlying action 
did not arise out of Richard and Ellen's ownership or use of Michael's 
automobile. 26 
Such an interpretation of the policy was preferable to that proposed 
out of: (1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles or all 
other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned or operated by ... an insured; 
... , /d. 
18 /d. at 242, 4% N.E.2d at 159-60. The "severability of insurance" clause states that 
"[t]his insurance applies separately to each insured. This condition shall not increase our 
limit of liability for any one occurance." /d. 
19 /d. at 241, 498 N.E.2d at 159. 
20 /d. at 242, 498 N.E.2d at 160 (emphasis in original). 
21 Jd. at 242-43, 498 N.E.2d at 160. 
22/d. at 242, 498 N.E.2d at 160. 
23 /d. The Court stated, "[T]he severability of insurance clause makes coverage available 
for Richard and Ellen Marnell." /d. at 244, 498 N.E.2d at 160. The Court distinguished 
Marnell from a similar Massachusetts case because the other case involved compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Desrosiers v. Royal Ins. Co., 393 Mass. 37, 468 N.E.2d 625 (1984). 
24 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
25 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
26 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 244, 498 N.E.2d at 161 ("Insured" when used in the context of 
a motor vehicle exclusion refers only to the individual claiming coverage). 
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by Worcester Mutual, the Court reasoned, because it gave reasonable 
meaning to both the motor vehicle exclusion and the severability of 
insurance clause. 27 Conceding that its interpretation rendered superfluous 
the phrase "any insured" in the motor vehicle exclusion, 28 the Court still 
preferred that interpretation because adoption of Worcester Mutual's 
interpretation would render the entire severability of insurance cla,use 
meaningless. 29 Thus, the Court's construction gives the maximum pos-
sible effect to both policy provisions. This interpretation extends home-
owners' coverage for negligent supervision claims to those who do not 
own or operate the automobile involved in the underlying action. Fur-
thermore, the motor vehicle exclusion continues to preclude coverage as 
to the particular "insured" who owns or operates the automobile involved 
in any such accident. 30 
By giving a reasonable meaning to both the motor vehicle exclusion 
and the severability of insuran<:e clause, the Court adhered to the long-
standing rule of construction favoring the interpretation which effectuates 
the "main manifested design of the parties. "31 The Court concluded that 
the purpose of a homeowners policy is to protect the homeowners from 
unexpected risks associated with the homeY In Marnell, the wrongful 
death complaint alleged that Richard and Ellen Marnell's negligent su-
pervision of activities occurring within their home had proximately 
caused the death of Robert Alioto. 33 The Court reasoned that the Marnells 
could reasonably expect coverage for such an unexpected incident to 
exist under the homeowners policy.34 
Significantly, the Court distinguished the negligent supervision theory 
which Marnell advanced from a theory of negligent entrustment. Negli-
gent entrustment derives from the concept of ownership, operation, and 
use of a motor vehicle. Negligent supervision, however, concerns an 
alleged failure to prevent certain activities within the insureds' house-
27 Id. at 245, 498 N.E.2d at 161 (citing Sherman v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 
343 Mass. 354, 357, 178 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1961)). 
28 ld. 
29 ld. (citing Desrosiers v. Royal Ins. Co., 393 Mass. 37, 40, 468 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1984)). 
3o Id. 
31 ld. (citing King v. Prudential Ins. Co., 359 Mass. 46, 50, 267 N.E.2d 643, 646 (1971), 
quoting Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 344 Mass. 99, 103-04, 181 
N.E.2d 557, 561 (1962)). 
32 /d. ("Clearly, the manifest design of homeowners insurance is to protect homeowners 
from risks associated with the home and activities related to the home."). 
33 ld. at 245-46, 498 N.E.2d at 161. But see id. at 243, 498 N.E.2d at 160 (inclusion of 
the phrase, "any insured" in the motor vehicle exclusion expressed the clear intention of 
the underwriter to exclude automobile .:ccidents from the scope of coverage under the 
homeowner's policy). 
34 Jd. at 245-46, 498 N.E.2d at 161. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/16
§ 13.1 INSURANCE LAW 373 
hold. 35 The Court distinguished negligent supervision of activities within 
the home from allegations which involve automobile ownership by the 
insured. 36 The Court held that Worcester Mutual had a duty to defend 
Richard and Ellen Marnell against the wrongful death because they were 
"insureds" under the policy who neither owned nor operated the auto-
mobile involved in the fatal accident, and plaintiffs' damage was alleged 
to have arisen from activities occurring in connection with the Mamells' 
home. 37 
Because of the peculiar factual situations in Marnell and other recent 
cases which have involved policies with motor vehicle exclusions and 
severability of insurance clauses,38 it is difficult to predict the future trend 
of such decisions. In the 1984 decision of Desrosiers v. Royal Ins. Co. 
of America,39 the Court refused to apply a severability of insurance clause 
to a motor vehicle exclusion.40 Although Marnell and Desrosiers reflect 
two opposing viewpoints to a similar problem, the Marnell Court sug-
gested that Desrosiers could be limited to its facts because, unlike Mar-
nell, it involved a policy of compulsory motor vehicle insurance. 41 Upon 
closer scrutiny, it appears that the Court in Marnell adopted an interpre-
tation of the motor vehicle exclusion and the severability of insurance 
clause which it believed courts should adopt as the general rule in Mas-
sachusetts; courts should read Desrosiers as an exception to that general 
rule. 42 Despite the holding in Desrosiers, such an interpretation is sup-
ported by the "considerable force" that exists, as Desrosiers acknowl-
edged, for applying a severability of interests clause to the motor vehicle 
liability exclusion. 43 
Assuming that the Marnell and Desrosiers decisions reflect the Su-
preme Judicial Court's willingness to extend the applicability of the se-
verability of insurance clause to the motor vehicle exclusion in a home-
owners policy, the question remains to what extent, if any, the motor 
vehicle exclusion is relevant in a homeowners policy. With regard to 
35 /d. at 243, 498 N.E.2d at 160 (citing Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lally, 
374 Mass. 602, 373 N.E.2d 966 (1977)). The Court distinguished negligent entrustment from 
negligent supervision by concluding that negligent entrustment is derived from the concept 
of ownership, operation and use of the automobile whereas an action involving negligent 
supervision is separate from the automobile involved in the accident. 
36 /d. 
37 /d. at 245-46, 498 N.E.2d at 161. 
38 See infra notes 39, 41-43 and accompanying text. 
39 393 Mass. 37, 468 N.E.2d 625 (1984). 
40 See Moran, Insurance Law, 1984 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW § 15.7, at 534, and cf. 
§ 15.4, at 520. 
41 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 240, 498 N.E.2d at 628. 
42 /d. See Desrosiers, 393 Mass. at 40, 469 N.E.2d at 628 (citations omitted). 
43 Desrosiers, 393 Mass. at 40, 468 N.E.2d at 628 (citations omitted). 
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named insureds whose alleged negligence is passive rather than active -
as in the case of Richard and Ellen Marnell - it is likely that the Court 
will apply the severability of insurance clause to the motor vehicle ex-
clusion as the general rule. Cases such as Desrosiers will become excep-
tions to that rule.44 Such an approach would comport with the Court's 
analysis in Desrosiers and its holding in Marnell. 45 It would also carry 
out the Court's stated preference for giving a reasonable meaning to all 
policy provisions rather than an interpretation that renders entire clauses 
inapplicable or meaningless.46 
Courts will, however, continue to uphold the motor vehicle exclusion 
when the homeowners' insured is directly and actively involved in the 
commission of an automobile tort. Giving effect to the motor vehicle 
exclusion in such a case would be entirely consistent with Marnell. In 
such an instance it would be the insured claiming coverage who was the 
person involved in the accident. Thus, consideration of the severability 
of interests clause will not be necessary in every accident case to deter-
mine the scope of coverage under a homeowners policyY What triggers 
homeowners coverage under Marnell is an allegation of negligence by a 
named insured that is separate and distinguishable from such insured's 
ownership, use, or operation of the motor vehicle alleged to have caused 
the bodily injury or property damage about which the plaintiffs com-
plain.48 Therefore, despite the decision in Marnell, the motor vehicle 
exclusion should still rave a limited application in a homeowners policy 
in Massachusetts. 
Clearly, however, the Court has limited the applicability of the motor 
vehicle exclusion in the homeowners policy,49 and in effect has rewritten 
that exclusion to read "each insured" rather than "any insured." In so 
doing, the Court overlooks or misconstrues the underwriting purpose 
served by the severability of insurance clause. 5° Insurers can be expected 
to re-evaluate the phrasing of their two clauses so as to effectuate better 
44 See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text. 
45 See supra notes 1-5 and 39-43 and accompanying text. 
46 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 246, 498 N.E.2d at 161. But cf, Reliance Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 218, 221-22, 457 N.E.2d 622, 647 (1983) rev'd 393 Mass. 
48, 51, 468 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1984) (application of severability of interests clause causes 
tractor trailer exclusion to be read out of commercial motor vehicle policy). 
47 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 244, 498 N.E.2d at 161. 
48 /d. at 245-46, 498 N.E.2d at 161. 
49 /d. at 242, 498 N.E.2d at 159-60. 
5° Compare Reliance Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 218, 221, 
456 N.E.2d 645, 647 (1983) ("The purpose of the severability of interests clause was to 
express an underwriting intent that nonliability or a discharge of liability under the policy 
as to one category of insured did not leave another category of insured unprotected."). 
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the underwriters' intentions underlying both provisions of the home-
owner's contract. 51 
§ 13.2. Excessive Indemnification - Amount of Recovery for Wind and 
Water Loss - Pro Rata Apportionment of Loss - Other Insurance -
Evidence of Value. In McCormick v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 1 the Ap-
peals Court scrutinized the coverage clauses of two insurance policies 
which insured the same property against separate and distinct risks of 
loss. 2 The court determined that the circumstances did not necessitate 
proration of the amount of the insured's loss between the two carriers.3 
The conflict arose over damage to an insured's home caused by contrib-
uting factors4 during the infamous "Blizzard of '78." The homeowner 
held two policies: one exclusively covering damage by flood5 and the 
other covering damage by windstorm. 6 The amount of loss was at ques-
tion, and the court allowed the homeowner to testify as to the value of 
the home before and after the storm. 7 
McCormick's dispute with Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) 
arose after the "Blizzard of '78."8 The McCormick home on Surfside 
Road in Scituate, Massachusetts, was damaged during that storm to such 
an extent that local officials condemned the structure; it was subsequently 
razed. 9 Under a policy issued by the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) of the Federal Insurance Administration, McCormick received 
policy proceeds of $35,000 in full settlement of flood damage to her 
home. 10 McCormick had a separate insurance contract in force at that 
time with Travelers, which expressly insured the property against damage 
caused by windstorms 11 but which specifically excluded coverage for 
damage from water, even if driven by wind. 12 
51 Marnell, 398 Mass. at 243, 244, 498 N.E.2d at 161. As the Court stated, "we agree 
that without the severability provision a literal reading of the motor vehicle exclusion by 
itself precludes the Mamells from coverage under the policy because Michael Marnell, an 
insured, owned and operated the motor vehicle involved in the fatal accident. But the 
severability of insurance clause makes coverage available to Richard and Ellen Marnell 
nonetheless." Id. at 244, 498 N.E.2d at 161. 
§ 13.2 1 22 Mass. App. Ct. 636, 496 N.E.2d 174 (1986). 
2 Id. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
3 Id. at 639, 496 N.E.2d at 176. 
4 Jd. at 636, 496 N.E.2d at 174. 
5 ld. 
6 Jd. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
7 ld. 
8 Id. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 174. 
9 Jd. at 636, 496 N.E.2d at 174. 
10 ld. 
11 Jd. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 174. 
12 ld. 
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Based on that water damage exclusion, Travelers denied any liability 
to McCormick on its policy. 13 McCormick subsequently filed the instant 
suit against Travelers, 14 claiming at trial that she sought compensation 
under Travelers' policy for only the property damage to the structure 
actually caused by. heavy winds. 15 Travelers argued that the property 
damage was caused by water, and thus excluded. 16 The jury returned a 
verdict for McCormick and the court entered the judgment. 17 
Travelers requested that the court reduce the judgment by the $35,000 
previously paid to McCormick by the NFIP. 18 The trial judge concluded 
that Travelers was not entitled to such proration because the policies 
insured against two separate and distinct risks. 19 Travelers appealed, 20 
arguing that the court should set aside the judgment on the ground that 
it was supported by insufficient evidence.21 Alternatively, Travelers ar-
gued that the judgment should be reduced on the grounds that it com-
pensated McCormick more than her actualloss.22 
The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. 23 The court began its anal-
ysis of the case by examining the sufficiency of the evidence presented. 24 
In particular, Travelers challenged the trial court's admission of Mc-
Cormick's opinion as to the fair market value of her property before the 
blizzard, which she had testified was $135,000.25 The Appeals Court found 
no error in the admission of such evidence. Although testimony as to 
value is usually given by experts, such testimony can be given by a non-
expert who is familiar with the property in question. 26 The court found 
that the plaintiff had based her opinion on years of residency and em-
ployment in ScituateY Also, the foundational evidence showed that 
McCormick previously had researched land valuations in her neighbor-
hood because she had an interest in selling her property28 just prior to 
the "Blizzard of '78. "29 
13 Id. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
2o Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
2S Id. 
26 See generally, LIACOS, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 118-19 (5th ed. 1981 & Supp. 1985). 
27 McCormick v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 636, 496 N.E.2d 174 (1986). 
28 Id. at 636, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
29 Id. 
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It would seem that McCormick did have an opinion based on particular 
familiarity with the subject property, which the law requires a property 
owner to show before he or she may express a valuation opinion.30 The 
Appeals Court noted that prior to plaintiff's testimony, the trial judge 
had correctly instructed the jury about the forthcoming opinion. 31 Under 
such circumstances, the trial judge must explain to the jury the difference 
between lay and expert testimony, note the legal requirement that the 
lay witness must demonstrate particular familiarity with the property, 
and instruct the jury as to the weight which it is free to give such 
evidence.32 The Appeals Court noted that in all respects, the judge gave 
correct instructions to the jury. 33 Based on McCormick's opinion testi-
mony regarding her property's fair market value- and the evidence that 
in 1978 the assessed value of McCormick's land was a mere fifteen 
percent of the total assessed valuation for her land and structure - the 
Appeals Court found that the jury had a sufficient basis for determining 
the amount of McCormick's compensable loss. 34 
The Appeals Court also considered the excessive indemnification issue 
raised by Travelers' assertion that McCormick had been permitted to 
recover more than the amount of her loss. 35 In its analysis, the court 
apparently believed that Travelers misperceived the jury's verdict. 36 
Travelers asserted that the jury's award of $80,000 was a determination 
of the extent of McCormick's property damage rather than a determi-
nation of the amount of the defendant's liability on its policyY On this 
basis Travelers sought a reduction in the judgment by subtracting the 
amount already paid by the NFIP. 38 It is axiomatic that any damage 
award should compensate a plaintiff for no more than the amount of 
damage actually suffered.39 Travelers argued that the happenstance of 
McCormick having two policies in force did not give her the right to 
recover indemnity for more than what she actually had lost due to the 
blizzard. 40 
30 LIACOS, supra note 26, at 118-19, notes that Massachusetts evidence law requires such 
a foundation before lay evidence as to property value may be admitted by a property owner. 
31 McCormick, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 638, 4% N.E.2d at 176. 
32 Jd. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Southwick v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 339 
Mass. 666, 668-69, 162 N.E.2d 271 (1969); LIAcos, supra note 26, at 118-19. 
33 McCormick, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
34 Id. at 638, 496 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Agoos Leather Cos. v. American & Foreign Ins. 
Co., 342 Mass. 603, 607-10, 342 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1961)). 
35 Id. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
36 Id. at 638, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
37 ld. 
38 /d. 
39 8A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4907.35, at 354 (1981); Wiggin V. 
Suffolk Ins. Co., 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 145, 153 (1836). 
40 McCormick, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 638, 496 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Kingsley v. Spofford, 
9
Moran and Reisch: Chapter 13: Insurance Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
378 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 13.2 
The court discredited Travelers arguments on several grounds. 41 Ac-
cording to the court, the jury had to determine the amount of defendants' 
liability based on how much of the total damage was caused by the 
winds.42 Travelers, according to the court, made no showing that the jury 
based its verdict in any way upon water damage rather than wind dam-
age.43 When making its determination, the jury had known of Mc-
Cormick's $35,000 flood policy settlement as well as the terms of the 
Travelers coverage and the exclusion of water damage upon which Trav-
elers relied. 44 The court concluded, therefore, that from this evidence 
the jury had a proper basis for determining to what extent wind caused 
McCormick's property damage.45 
The language of Travelers' policy, according to the court, defeated its 
claim for a pro-rata apportionment of the loss with the NFIP policy.46 
The "pro-rate liability" clause of Travelers' policy provided that it would 
not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss "than the amount hereby 
issued shall bear to the whole insurance covering the property against 
the peril covered." In this case it was undisputed that the "peril" insured 
against by Travelers was the risk of windstormY Thus, the court con-
strued the "other insurance" clause of Travelers' policy to limit the 
proration provision to only those situations where the damage was the 
result of identical "perils"48 covered under both Travelers' policy and 
any other policies held by the insured.49 The Travelers' policy insured 
298 Mass. 469, 475, 11 N.E.2d 487, 491-92 (1937), quoting from Tabbot v. American Ins. 
Co., 185 Mass. 419, 421, 70 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1904)). 
41 McCormick, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 638-39, 469 N.E.2d at 175-76. 
42 Id. at 638, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
43 /d. at 639, 496 N.E.2d at 176. 
44 /d. at 638, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
45 The court discussed, however, whether a special verdict had been requested of the 
jury pursuant to Rule 49 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. The record on 
appeal did not show whether special questions were posed to the jury regarding the degree 
of water versus wind damage. If such questions had been asked there would have been no 
uncertainty as to the degree to which the jury had considered water and wind to be causative 
factors in McCormick's property damage. McCormick, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 639, 496 
N.E.2d at 176. 
46 ld. 
47 ld. 
48 ld. 
49 ld. at 176 n.2, 496 N.E.2d at 176 n.2. That clause, entitled "Other Insurance," states 
in pertinent part: 
The company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss from any peril 
or perils included in this policy (l) than the applicable limit of liability under this 
policy bears to the whole amount of ... insurance covering the property, or which 
would have covered the property except for the existence of this insurance, whether 
collectible or not, and whether or not such other . . . insurance covers against the 
additional perils or perils insured hereunder, nor (2) for a greater proportion of any 
10
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against various named perils including the peril of wind damage, while 
the NFIP policy covered only damage by water.50 Therefore, the cover-
ages of the two policies did not overlap but were separate and distinct. 51 
It is a fundamental principle that to constitute "other insurance" per-
mitting proration of a loss, the policies in question must cover the same 
risks. 52 It seems clear that the court reasoned correctly in this regard; 
the reasoning accords with this basic principle of "other insurance. "53 As 
the court noted, it "is generally held that in order for a proportionate 
recovery clause to operate in the insurer's favor, there must, under the 
policies, be both an identity of the insured interest and an identity of 
risk; and the requirement with respect to identity of risk is not obviated 
by the fact that the apportionment clause refers to other insurance 
'whether concurrent or not. "'54 The two policies here in question con-
tained no such ambiguity and were clear as to their respective risks. 55 
The McCormick decision is more important for its evidentiary analysis 
than its interpretation of the insurance coverage. The court's treatment 
of the valuation opinion offered by the lay plaintiff of her property's 
value raises questions as to its actual sufficiency. Although once it was 
assumed that an owner of property had sufficient familiarity to testify to 
its value, the practicality of this supposition no longer exists. 56 An owner 
now, like any other witness, must be particularly familiar with the prop-
erty to testify to its value.57 For example, one who owns several prop-
erties, or an investor who purchases an interest in a real estate investment 
trust, might prove to be far less familiar with the actual condition of such 
properties than an owner-occupant of single-family residential property. 
As McCormick makes clear, the proposition that an owner of a property 
may te~tify as a lay witness as to her opinion of its value, includes the 
qualification criteria that the Appeals Court found the trial court had 
applied. 58 For lay as well as expert opinion evidence, the proponent must 
/d. 
loss than the applicable limit of liability under this policy bears to all insurance 
whether collectible or not, covering in any manner such loss, or which would have 
covered such loss except for the existence of this insurance. 
50 /d. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 174. 
si Id. 
52 /d. at 639, 496 N.E.2d at 176 (quoting 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 3907 (1972)). 
sJ Id. 
54 I d. at 639-40,496 N.E.2d at 176 (quoting 16 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2o, § 62:93 (Rhodes 
Rev. 1983)). 
ss ld. 
56 See LIACOS, supra note 26, at 119. 
57 ld. 
58 McCormick, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 639-40, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
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establish a foundation as to the source of the witness's knowledge and 
the basis for that testimony. 59 
The court's analysis of the excessive indemnification issue was orien-
tated to the specific facts of McCormick. 60 The insurer failed to prove 
that the judgment reflected all the property damage which a combination 
of overlapping elements had caused. 61 Because there was no proof that 
the perils overlapped, proration was not justified under Travelers' own 
"other insurance" clause.62 The court hinted, however, that if the defen-
dant could have shown (possibly through special questions to the jury) 
that the jury had decided on the degree of damages caused by wind and 
water, then the insurer would have had better grounds to justify such 
proration.63 
§ 13.3. Penal Sum of Bond Defines Surety's Liability - "Per Occur-
rence" Interpretation Rejected for Surety Bonds. In a case of first impres-
sion in Massachusetts, during the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court 
faced the question of whether a surety on a public warehouseman's 
licensing bond is liable for all claims against the warehouseman only to 
a maximum of the penal sum of the bond, or whether the bond applies 
on a "per occurrence" basis to each such claim. 1 The Court in Peerless 
Insurance Co. v. South Boston Storage and Warehouse held that a surety 
is liable only to the extent of the penal sum of the bond, irrespective of 
the number of claimants.2 
Suretyship is the contractual relationship created when one party, the 
surety, guarantees under certain circumstances the payment or perfor-
mance owed by another party (the "principal") to a third party (the 
"obligee"). 3 The surety's obligation is set out in a bond running not to 
the principal, but to· the obligee.4 By virtue of chapter 175, section 2, 
'
9 Id. at 637, 496 N.E.2d at 175. 
60 Id. at 637-40, 496 N.E.2d at 175-76. 
61 ld. 
62 Id. at 640, 496 N.E.2d at 176. 
63 ld. 
§ 13.3 1 397 Mass. 325, 491 N.E.2d 253 (1986). One of the authors represented The 
Surety Association of Massachusetts and the American Insurance Association, which 
jointly submitted an amici curiae brief to the Supreme Judicial Court in this matter. 
2 Id. at 326, 491 N.E.2d at 253. 
3 See generally, G.L. C. 175, § 105; RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§§ 82-83 (1941). 
4 Inapplicable to surety bonds, therefore, are statutory provisions allowing a judgment 
creditor to reach and apply an insurer's obligations under an insurance contract. Cf G.L. 
c. 175, §§ ll2, ll3 and c. 214, § 3(9). 
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contracts of insurance essentially embody two-party relationships; in 
contrast, surety bonds are tripartite in nature. 5 In this case, Peerless was 
the surety in a licensing bond which the principal, South Boston Storage 
and Warehouse, Inc. posted in obtaining a license as a public warehouse 
from the Commissioner of Public Safety.6 The bond, as required by 
chapter 105, expressly ran in favor of the State Treasurer, as obligee.7 
Several claimants confronted Peerless alleging loss or damage to their 
property while stored by South Boston Storage. The aggregate claims far 
exceeded the penal sum of Peerless' bond.8 Peerless attempted to limit 
its liability to the penal sum of that bond by tendering it into court for 
payment and filing a complaint for declaratory relief and interpleader 
against the claimants, the State Treasurer as bond obligee, and the Com-
missioner of Public Safety as the relevant licensing authority.9 Peerless' 
motion for summary judgment, which raised the question of the extent 
of its liability under the bond, was reported to the Appeals Court, 10 and 
the Supreme Judicial Court took the case on direct appellate review 
pursuant to chapter 211A, section 10(A). 11 
The Commonwealth and the claimants argued that the language of the 
bond and the provisions of the public warehouseman statute required a 
"per occurrence" interpretation. 12 The Court, however, rejected this ar-
gument and relied instead on "settled principles of contract and surety-
ship law"13 to hold that a surety bond is a contract which establishes the 
limits of the surety's liability. 14 
Massachusetts law recognizes the contractual nature of a statutory 
bond obligation. In Treasurer & Receiver General v. Massachusetts 
Bonding & Insurance Co., the Court held that sureties "cannot be [held] 
beyond the fair scope of their engagement, as intended by the parties 
when undertaken. "15 That the bond is statutory does not create a larger 
5 By statute, surety contracts in Massachusetts are deemed not to be contracts of insur-
ance. G.L. c. 175, § 107; General Electric Co. v. Lexington Contracting Corp., 363 Mass. 
122, 124, 292 N.E.2d 874, 876 (1973). 
6 Peerless, 397 Mass. at 326, 491 N.E.2d at 253-54. 
7 Id. at 326, 491 N.E.2d at 254. 
Bfd. 
9 /d. 
10 ld. 
"Id. 
l2fd. 
13 /d. 
l4fd. 
15 349 Mass. 256, 258, 207 N.E.2d 684, 686 (1965) (citing President of Dedham Bank v. 
Chickering, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 314, 340 (1827)). 
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risk for the surety. 16 Consistent with this contractual analysis, 17 Massa-
chusetts has long accepted the fundamental rule that limits a surety's 
liability on a surety bond to the penal sum named in the bond. "[T]he 
measure of the principal's liability ceases to operate as the rule against 
the surety when that liability exceeds the penalty agreed upon."18 As 
held in Brown v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 19 
The maximum for which the defendant can in any event be held liable is 
the penalty of the bond .... Up to that amount as the maximum, the 
surety may be held for the damages actually sustained by the obligee on 
the bond. For more than that amount the surety cannot be held no matter 
how great may be the damages sustained by the obligee . . . . If [the 
plaintiff's actual damage] is more t9an the penal sum of the bond, with 
interest, it cannot enhance the liability of the surety. If it is less than the 
penal sum of the bond the surety gets the benefit. 20 
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Casassa, 21 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a surety's liability on a construction bond fol-
lowed "the general rule that the penal amount named in the bond limits 
the amount of recovery to that sum. ':Z2 Similarly, Union Market National 
Bank of Watertown v. Nonantum Investment Co.,23 held that recovery 
16 /d. The Court held that a bond given pursuant to a statute should be understood to 
provide the coverage which the legislature has required in order for the right which the 
statute provides. /d. at 257, 207 N.E.2d at 685-86 (citing United States v. Hartford Ace. 
& Indem. Co., 117 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1941)). 
17 Because a surety bond is deemed not to be an insurance contract, see G.L. c. 175, 
§ 107 and General Electric Co. v. Lexington Contracting Corp., 363 Mass. 122, 124, 292 
N .E.2d 874, 876 (1973), it follows that contra insurer rules of policy construction have no 
application in cases involving true surety bonds: "The contract of a surety is interpreted 
according to the standards that govern the interpretation of contracts in general." REs-
TATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 88 (1941). 
18 Bank of Brighton v. Smith, 94 Mass. (11 Allen) 243, 251 (1866). 
19 249 Mass. 511, 516, 144 N.E. 395, 396 (1924). 
20 /d. at 516, 144 N.E. at 396. This principle is similarly recognized by Corbin and other 
commentators: 
One who guarantees payment of the debt of another is always promising the same 
performance as is the principal debtor. This is true even though he [the surety] limits 
the amount of his liability. Up to that limit, the performance promised is one and 
the same. 
CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS,§ 926 (1951). As for amounts beyond a bond's penal sum, however, 
the surety's obligations are not joint with those of the defaulting principal. "The surety's 
obligation may be co-extensive with that of his principal or may be less, as where the debt 
is $10,000 and the surety has guaranteed only $5,000 .... Suretyship obligations are 
contractual, and the important point of inquiry should be the precise undertaking of the 
surety and the duty of the principal." RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 82 comment (g) (1941). 
In this regard, the RESTATEMENT recognizes that a "surety's liability may be limited ... 
by a stipulated maximum." /d. at§ 83 comment (b). 
21 301 Mass. 246, 16 N.E.2d 860 (1938). 
"ld. at 255-56, 16 N.E.2d at 866. 
23 291 Mass. 439, 197 N.E. 57 (1935). 
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on a banking surety bond was limited to the penal sum of the bond even 
though the claimant's damages exceeded the face amount of the bond. 24 
Moreover, the Massachusetts statute which generally governs actions 
against bonds -General Laws chapter 235, sections 9-13 -also em-
bodies this general rule. Chapter 235, section 10 authorizes a court in 
equity to issue execution against a bond "for so much of the penal sum 
as is then due and payable;"25 section 12 of that statute allows such 
recoveries against a bond "until the penalty is exhausted. "26 
At one time, the State of Washington adopted a minority rule. In Salo 
v. Pacific Coast Casualty Company, 27 the Washington Court adopted a 
"per occurrence" rule,28 reasoning that if a bond were exhausted, it would 
be possible for the principal to continue to engage in business with a 
bond posted on which the surety could have no liability. 29 The court 
concluded that the Washington legislature did not intend such a result, 
and thus each claimant could recover to the extent of the penal sum even 
though the combined recoveries exceeded that bond penalty.30 
In Peerless, the Supreme Judicial Court was largely guided by General 
Laws chapter 235, sections 9, 10, and 12. As perceived by the Court, 
those statutes reflected the legislature's intent that a surety be liable only 
to the extent of the penal sum of its bondY In deciding for Peerless, the 
Court drew Massachusetts in line with the current thinking of every 
jurisdiction which has confronted this issue. 32 This decision is important 
24 /d. at 444, 197 N.E. at 60. 
25 G.L. c. 235, § 10. 
26 G.L. c. 235, § 12. 
27 95 Wash. 109, 163 P. 384 (1917). 
28 /d. Salois cited in Rolen v. Rauhuff, 315 F. Supp. 935, 938 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). 
29 Salo, 95 Wash. at 111, 163 P. at 386. 
30 Even in Washington State, the "per occurrence" rule is no longer in effect. As noted 
in Paulsell v. Peters, 9 Wash. 2d 599, 603 115 P.2d 708, 711-12 (1941), the Washington 
legislature amended the public warehouseman's statute to reverse the "per occurrence" 
holding of Commercial State Bank v. Palmerton-Moore Grain Co., 152 Wash. 89, 277 P. 
389 (1929). Thus, at the present time, no state recognizes a "per occurrence" rule relative 
to public warehouseman's licensing bonds. 
31 Peerless, 397 Mass. at 327, 491 N.E.2d at 254. 
32 Every case addressing this specific issue has expressly rejected "per occurrence" 
liability under a surety bond. See, e.g., United States v. America Surety Co. of New York, 
172 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 337 U.S. 930 (1949); Town of Brookfield v. Greenridge, 
Inc., 177 Conn. 527, 418 A.2d 907 (1979); New Haven v. Eastern Paving Brick Co., 78 
Conn. 689, 698, 63 A. 517 (1906); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Askew, 280 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 
App. 1973); Jaeger Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 229 Iowa 158, 294 
N.W. 268 (1940); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 505, 
245 N.W.2d 209 (1976); Totowa v. American Surety of New York, 39 N.J. 332, 188 A.2d 
586 (1963); National Grange Mutual Ins. Co. v. Prioleau, 269 S.C. 161, 236 S.E.2d 808 
(1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 69 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1934). 
See also 74 AM. JuR. 2o Suretyship § 165 (1974). 
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to bonding companies and corporate sureties, not just because of the 
clear limit it places on their contractual liability, but principally because 
of the impact there might have been if the Supreme Judicial Court had 
breathed life into the moribund Washington "per occurrence" theory. 
Quite properly, the Court unequivocally rejected a "per occurrence" 
construction of surety bonds as antithetical to fundamental principles of 
contract and suretyship law. 33 Because even a statutory bond is a con-
tract, the surety's liability justifiably is limited to the amount agreed upon 
by the parties. As the Court wisely observed, "liberality of construction 
should not place burdens on an obligor that it did not assume in its 
contract. "34 
§ 13.4. Wrongful Death Damages - Loss of Consortium and Society -
"Per Person" or "Per Accident" Limits. For almost one hundred years, 
damages awarded in Massachusetts in a wrongful death action have been 
in a single, indivisible amount. Until 1973, the nature of the recovery 
was punitive, measured against the defendant's culpability. While this is 
no longer the case, the present wrongful death statute still requires a 
single, indivisible reward. During the Survey year, the Appeals Court 
clarified in Doyon v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 1 that any award of damages 
for wrongful death encompasses claims for loss of consortium as well as 
the estate's statutory claim under General Laws, chapter 229. The issue 
on appeal was whether chapter 229, section 2 permits the recovery of 
wrongful death damages in a single sum "per accident" or in separate 
amounts "per person. "2 The Appeals Court concluded that such damages 
are to be awarded in a single, indivisible amount under the wrongful 
death statute, and that the claims of a wife and a child are simply separate 
ingredients of that single amount recoverable by the decedent's personal 
administrator for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries. 3 
The Doyon plaintiff was the administrator of the deceased's estate; no 
claim for conscious pain and suffering was involved in this case.4 The 
deceased died instantly as a result of injuries sustained when an auto-
mobile owned and operated by the defendant's insured struck the dece-
dent. 5 A wife and minor child survived the decedent, and the court 
concluded that the wrongful death action was the vehicle by which the 
33 Peerless, 397 Mass. at 328, 491 N.E.2d at 255. 
34 Id. 
§ 13.4 1 22 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 493 N.E.2d 887 (1986). 
2 Id. at 337, 493 N.E.2d at 887-88. 
3 ld. at 339, 493 N.E.2d at 889. 
4 Id. at 336-37, 493 N.E.2d at 887-88. 
5 ld. at 336, 493 N.E.2d at 887. The circumstances of the death did not support a claim 
for the decedent's conscious suffering and pain. Id. 
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administrator pressed the widow's claim for loss of consortium and the 
child's claim for the loss of the companionship and society of his parent. 6 
In and of themselves, these two subsidiary claims were appropriate.? In 
Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a spouse 
has an independent claim for loss of consortium when the other spouse 
is negligently injured.9 Similarly, Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 
Inc., 10 established that a minor child has a claim for loss of society and 
companionship when a parent suffers a negligently inflicted injury, so 
long as the child can demonstrate that he is a minor dependent on that 
parent. 11 
In Massachusetts, a claim for wrongful death is derived from chapter 
229, section 2. In Ferris v. Monsanto Co., 12 the Court dismissed a wid-
ow's claim for loss of consortium on the grounds that it was included in 
an administrator's statutory claim for wrongful death.B The Supreme 
Judicial Court held in Cimino v. Milford Keg, lnc., 14 that a widow's claim 
for loss of consortium is present in every wrongful death action. 15 Simi-
larly, the Court stated in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 16 that 
loss of society for which minor children are entitled to recover would be 
included as part of a wrongful death claim under chapter 229, section 2. 17 
Because a wrongful death claim is purely statutory in nature, both the 
award of damages and the amounts allowed similarly derive from the 
statute. 18 
In Doyon, the plaintiffs argued that the wife and child were separate 
persons for purposes of the "per person" as well as the "per accident" 
limits of the policy which Travelers had issued to the operator responsible 
for the death of plaintiff's intestate. 19 Plaintiff relied principally on Bil-
odeau v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 20 in which the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a loss of consortium claimant is a separate 
"person" entitled to an independent "per person" recovery within the 
6 /d. at 337, 493 N.E.2d at 888. 
7 Id. at 337-38, 493 N.E.2d at 888-89. 
8 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). 
9 /d. at 167-68, 302 N.E.2d at 564. 
10 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980). See also Annot., II A.L.R.4th 518 (1980). 
11 ld. at 515-16, 413 N.E.2d at 696. 
12 380 Mass. 694, 405 N.E.2d 644 (1980). 
13 !d. at 694 n.l, 405 N .E.2d at 645 n.l. 
14 385 Mass. 323, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982). 
15 ld. at 334, 431 N.E.2d at 927. 
16 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980). See also Annot., II A.L.R.4th 518 (1980). 
17 Id. at 515, 413 N.E.2d at 695. 
18 Doyon, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 338, 493 N.E.2d at 888. 
19 Id. at 337, 493 N.E.2d at 888. 
20 392 Mass. 537, 467 N.E.2d 137 (1984). 
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"per accident" limits of the insured's policy. 21 In Doyon, Travelers had 
paid the plaintiff $100,000 under a settlement agreement which permitted 
further litigation of plaintiff's theory that the widow and child were two 
separate and distinct claimants, each entitled to the full "per person" 
amount of $100,000 available under Travelers' policy. 22 
The Appeals Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff. 23 The court distinguished Bilodeau because in that case the loss of 
consortium claim arose from the injured's claim for pain and suffering, 
while in Doyon the plaintiff administrator used the wrongful death statute 
to assert the claims for loss of consortium and society. 24 Because the 
claims and damages for loss of consortium and society in Doyon were 
founded in the wrongful death statute, the court viewed plaintiff's reli-
ance on Bilodeau as misplaced. 
The court considered the history and use of the wrongful death statute. 
Between 1950 and 1973, the statute provided that courts were to assess 
damages in a wrongful death action, within specified limits, according to 
the defendant's degree of culpability. 25 Therefore, because the award was 
punitive to the defendant rather than compensatory to the plaintiffs, the 
amount of the award did not vary according to the number of persons 
who were entitled to recover. 26 In Gaudette v. Webb, 27 the Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled that the liability in a wrongful death action based on 
the degree of culpability of the defendant cannot be varied according to 
the number of beneficiaries, even if any of those beneficiaries are guilty 
of contributory negligence. 28 
Chapter 229, section 2 in its present form no longer emphasizes the 
punitive nature of the damage remedy.29 The award is now largely com-
pensatory, with no monetary limit set on the total amount of the recov-
21 Id. at 538, 467 N.E.2d at 138. 
22 Doyon, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 337, 493 N.E.2d at 888. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. In Bilodeau, the injured person had not died from his injuries. Consequently, the 
husband's claim for loss of consortium was distinct, as it did not rely on G.L. c. 229, § 2. 
Bilodeau, 392 Mass. at 538-39, 467 N.E.2d at 138-39. 
25 Doyon, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 338, 493 N.E.2d at 888. 
26 ld. The court cited St. 1949, c. 427 § 3; St. 1958, c. 238 § 1; and St. 1965, c. 683 § 1. 
27 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972). See also Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 893 (1972). 
28 Gaudette, 362 Mass. at 73 n.9, 284 N.E.2d at 231 n.9. The court cited RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF ToRTS § 493, which states that the amount of damages in a wrongful death 
action is fixed by the gravity of the defendant's fault. See also Oulighan v. Butler, 189 
Mass. 287, 75 N.E. 726 (1905) and Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912). 
Both cases held that the damages in a wrongful death action are assessed to the degree of 
the defendant's culpability. Oulighan, 189 Mass. at 295, 75 N.E. at 729; Brown, 212 Mass. 
at 399, 99 N.E. at 240. 
29 Doyon, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 338, 493 N.E.2d at 888. 
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ery. 30 The Appeals Court noted, however, that the statute is expressly 
worded to permit "persons" to collect an "amount" of damages. 31 Thus, 
an unlimited number of persons entitled to recovery may collect a single 
amount. 32 The damages amount is indeterminate from case to case, de-
pending on the number of beneficiaries per case and the amount each is 
entitled to receive, but the defendant is liable under section 2 for only a 
single, indivisible amount. 33 
Without overturning any major doctrines of common law or judicial 
interpretation, the Appeals Court in Doyon clarified the nature in which 
courts are to award damages in a wrongful death action. While the court 
recognized that damages in such actions are no longer punitive, it upheld 
the long tradition in Massachusetts of awarding single, indivisible damage 
awards in a wrongful death action. That tradition is preserved in the 
present form of chapter 229 which allows for a sole amount notwithstand-
ing the compensatory nature of the remedy. 
§ 13.5. Liquor Liability Exclusion - Obligation of Insurer to Defend 
Insured When Necessary Elements For Exclusion Are Not Present. In 
Newell-Blais Post #443, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States 
v. The Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 1 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a 
declaratory judgment of the superior court which ordered The Shelby 
Mutual Insurance Company (Shelby Mutual) to defend Newell-Blais Post 
#443 of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (Newell-Blais). The Court, how-
ever, vacated that portion of the trial court's declaration which required 
Shelby Mutual to indemnify Newell-Blais. The Court reasoned that a 
decision as to indemnification should be held in abeyance until after the 
trial of the underlying wrongful death action. 2 
Newell-Blais was a non-profit veterans organization, incorporated un-
der chapter 180 of the General Laws, licensed to serve alcoholic bever-
ages on its premises.3 Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against New-
ell-Blais which alleged that the veterans post negligently served alcoholic 
beverages to a patron, and that as a result of this negligence the patron 
had carelessly operated his motor vehicle causing the death of two minor 
children. 4 
30 I d. 
31 ld. 
32 ld. 
33 Jd. at 339, 493 N.E.2d at 889. 
§ 13.5 1 396 Mass. 633, 487 N.E.2d 1371 (1986). The authors' law firm represented the 
defendant, The Shelby Mutual Insurance Company. 
2 Id. at 633, 487 N.E.2d at 1372. 
3 Jd. 
4 ld. 
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Shelby Mutual had issued Newell-Blais a comprehensive general lia-
bility insurance policy in the standard 1973 form, which obligated the 
insurer to defend and indemnify Newell-Blais against any suit for bodily 
injury or property damage covered by the policy.5 The policy, however, 
contained a liquor liability exclusion, clause (h)(i), which provided that 
coverage did not apply where the insured or his indemnitee might be held 
liable as a person or organization engaged in the business of manufac-
turing, distributing, selling or serving alcoholic beverages. 6 The issue 
before the court was whether the veterans post qualified as a "business" 
for the purpose of the liquor liability exclusion. Shelby Mutual argued 
that Newell-Blais was a business for the purpose of the exclusion.? New-
ell-Blais argued that its non-profit status shielded the club from the ex-
clusion. 8 The Court ruled that the plain meaning of the word "business" 
was applicable because the word was unambiguous in the policy, and 
thus held that the bar operated by the veterans post was not a "business. "9 
The language in the second half of the liquor liability exclusion, clause 
(h)(2)(i), excluded from coverage, liability imposed by or because of the 
violation of any statute, ordinance or regulation pertaining to the sale, 
gift, distribution or use of any alcoholic beverage to a minor or to a 
person under the influence of alcohol or which causes or contributes to 
the intoxication of any person. 10 Shelby Mutual additionally disclaimed 
its liability to defend and indemnify Newell-Blais on the ground that the 
veterans post had violated chapter 138, section 69, which prohibits a 
licensed seller from selling alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person 
or a person known to have been intoxicated within 6 months preceeding. 11 
The Court held that this language in the liquor liability exclusion of 
the comprehensive general liability policy was insufficient to excuse the 
insurer from its duty to defend the wrongful death action against Newell-
Blais, inasmuch as that complaint was based upon common law negli-
genceY Previously, in Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 13 the 
Court decided that a similar exclusion did not preclude coverage where 
liability was imposed by reason of any statute or ordinance pertaining to 
the negligent distribution or sale of alcohol. 14 The language of the liquor 
liability exclusion of the Shelby Mutual policy appeared to import "a 
'ld. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. at 635, 487 N.E.2d at 1373. 
8 ld. 
9 Id. at 636, 487 N.E.2d at 1373. 
10 ld. 
11 Id. 
12 ld. 
13 357 Mass. 271, 257 N.E.2d 774 (1920). 
14 Newell-Blais, 396 Mass. at 636, 487 N.E.2d at 1373. 
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direct causal relationship between the fact of liability and the violation 
of the statute. " 15 Thus, the Court concluded that this clause excluded 
coverage only where the violation of a statute, without more, was suffi-
cient to impose liability. 16 
The Newell-Blais plaintiff based their wrongful death action upon com-
mon law principles of negligence. 17 They asserted violation of chapter 
138, section 69 in the wrongful death complaint only as evidence of the 
veteran post's negligence; it would not, without more, be sufficient to 
impose civil liability on Newell-Blais. 18 Thus, the Court held that the 
veteran post's alleged violation of this penal statute did not preclude its 
coverage under the comprehensive general liability policy. 19 
The Supreme Judicial Court applied essentially the same standard of 
construction and interpretation to the Newell-Blais case as the Court has 
applied in previous cases. 20 Although strict construction of ambiguous 
policy terms against an insurer appears unfair in many instances, the 
standard is merely an approach adopted by the courts as a reaction to 
the impetus of growing concern for consumer protection. 21 
An insurer can protect itself to some degree by including definitions of 
terms and phrases in the insurance policies. By elaborating on the pro-
visions, there will be less likelihood for disagreements concerning the 
scope of coverage. If Shelby Mutual, in underwriting the Newell-Blais 
operations, had included in its policy a modified definition of the word 
"business" to expressly invoke the liquor liability exclusion, thereby 
clarifying that the underwriters intended the sale of liquor for a profit by 
the otherwise non-profit organization to be an excluded "business" op-
eration, the insurer might have avoided having to defend the veteran's 
post against the wrongful claim action. 
The holding in Newell-Blais does not change the current state of Mas-
sachusetts law. The Court applied the traditional general rules of con-
struction, and held that the word "business" in the liquor liability exclu-
sion was unambiguous. 22 The Court applied the ordinary and usual 
15 /d. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. See McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 158, 496 N.E.2d 
141, 143 (1986); Adamian v. Three Sons, 353 Mass. 498, 499, 233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968); 
Wiska v. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 817, 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1135 
(1979). 
19 Newe/1-B/ais, 396 Mass. at 636, 487 N.E.2d at 1373. 
w See Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 357 Mass. 271, 257 N.E.2d 774 (1920). 
21 20 POF2d 74. 
22 It is not unreasonable for courts to apply the ordinary and usual meaning of a word to 
exclusionary policy provisions if the word is not inherently ambiguous. In fact, this general 
rule which the courts adopted is quite rational. Although somewhat rigid, this rule of 
construction leads to certainty and predictability. 
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meaning ofthe term and rejected the insurer's position, citing its previous 
decision in Three Sons as controlling case law. The court denied Shelby 
Mutual's claim that Newell-Blais' violation of a penal statute in the course 
of serving liquor excused the insurer from having to defend its insured. 
The Court held that the wrongful death claim was based on common law 
negligence and not the violation of a penal statute and, therefore, con-
cluded that the insurer was obligated to defend its insured in accordance 
with terms of the comprehensive general liability policy. 
§ 13.6. Care, Custody and Control Exclusion- Allegations of Complaint 
Reasonably Susceptible of Interpretation of Claim Covered By Policy -
Effect of Insurer's Wrongful Failure to Defend. In Crane Service & Equip-
ment v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1 the Appeals Court 
scrutinized the so-called "care, custody and control" exclusion of the 
standard comprehensive general liability policy, which provides that the 
policy does not apply to liability for damage to property "rented to, used 
by, and in the care, custody or control of" the insured.2 In this case, 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (USF&G) argued that the word 
"rental" on a crane company's invoice to its insured, Caputo Construc-
tion Company (Caputo) was conclusive of the intention of the parties. 3 
On that basis, USF&G disclaimed coverage for property damage to a 
crane used on a Caputo construction site, arguing that the crane came 
within the exclusions for property "rented to," "used by," and "in the 
care, custody or control of" its insured.4 USF&G's insured, Caputo, had 
been supplied with the crane, an operator, and an oiler by the named 
plaintiff, Crane Service. 5 The operator and the oiler retained physical 
control over the crane at all times.6 Caputo paid an hourly fee for the 
crane service.7 The members of the crew were employees of Crane 
Service, which paid their salaries, employment taxes, and provided their 
worker's compensation insurance.8 Crane Service and not Caputo re-
tained control over hiring and firing of the crew and responsibility for 
fueling and repairing the crane.9 At the end of each day, the operator and 
the oiler retained the keys to the crane. 10 Although Caputo supervised 
§ 13.6 1 22 Mass. App. Ct. 666, 496 N.E.2d 833 (1986). The authors' law firm repre-
sented the named plaintiff in this action. 
2 I d. at 668, 496 N .E.2d at 834. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. 
5 ld. 
6 ld. 
7 ld. 
8 Id. 
9Jd. 
10 ld. 
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the crane's activities, this coordinating function was typical of the rela-
tionship between general contractor and subcontractor on a construction 
site. 11 
The insurer's liability to cover its insured under these circumstances 
turned upon the court's interpretation of Caputo's contractual relation-
ship with Crane Service. 12 The Appeals Court found guidance in a Mich-
igan federal court decision, Insurance Company of North America v. 
Northwestern National Insurance Company, 13 which stated that "since 
the term 'rented' does not lie with an inherent ambiguity to this particular 
fact situation, it is only necessary to determine the ordinary meaning of 
that term. " 14 The chief characteristic of "renting" or "leasing," according 
to the Michigan court, is the giving up of possession to the hirer so that 
the hirer and not the owner uses and controls the rented property. 15 
Following this reasoning, the Appeals Court looked to the party who 
retained true possession and control of the crane, rather than to how the 
invoice characterized the contractual arrangement between the parties. 16 
The court held that the dispositive factors of possession and control 
favored construing the transaction as a service contract rather than an 
equipment lease. 17 Furthermore, the court noted that in the absence of 
any indicia of possession or control, it could hardly be said in this case 
that USF&G's insured, Caputo, had "custody" of the crane. 18 
USF&G also denied coverage on the basis that the crane was "used 
by" the insured. 19 The court held that the words "used by" implies the 
same elements of responsibility for the damaged object which it had 
already concluded the insured did not possess. 20 Therefore, the court 
reasoned that the insurer could not disclaim liability even under this last 
aspect of the "care, custody and control" exclusion in the general liability 
policy. 21 
The court also reiterated the now familiar rule that the duty of a liability 
insurer to defend its insured attaches if the "allegations of the complaint 
a're 'reasonably susceptible' of an interpretation that they state or ad-
umbrate a claim covered by the policy terms."22 Deciding whether there 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
13 371 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Mich. 1973). 
14 Id. at 554. 
15 ld. 
16 Crane Service, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 668, 496 N.E.2d at 835. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 Id. 
20 ld. 
21 Id. 
22 Jd. at 669, 496 N.E.2d at 835. 
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is a duty involves "envisaging what losses may be proved as lying within 
the range of the allegations of the complaint, and then seeing whether 
any such loss fits the expectation of protective insurance reasonably 
generated by the terms of the policy. "23 The Appeals Court faithfully 
followed the precedent of Continental Casualty Co. v. Gilbane Building 
Co., 24 where the allegations of a complaint were held by the Supreme 
Judicial Court to be "reasonably susceptible" of an interpretation stating 
a covered claim,25 and Sterlite Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,26 where 
the same standard was applied to allegations asserted in a third-party 
complaintY Particularly significant in this case, however, is that the 
Appeals Court applied the 1935 decision of Miller v. United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co. 28 to foreclose USF&G, "having defaulted in its 
duty to defend,"29 from contesting the underlying judgment against its 
insured, Caputo.3o 
§ 13.7. Surplus Line Insurer - Interpretation of Standard Fire Policy 
- Interest Payable on Fire Loss - Scope of Statutory Reference as to Loss 
and Value. In Church of Christ in Lexington v. St. Paul Surplus Lines 
Insurance Company, 1 the Appeals Court ruled that a surplus line2 insurer, 
whose fire insurance policy expressly indicated that the state's standard 
fire policy would govern its terms if required by the state, should be held 
to the language it drafted. This is particularly true where doing so com-
23 Id. (quoting Sterlite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 318, 458 
N.E.2d 338, 341 (1983)). Also see Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 166-67, 
450 N.E.2d 190, 194 (1983). 
24 391 Mass. 143, 146, 461 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1984). 
25 Crane Service, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 669, 496 N.E.2d at 835. 
26 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 317, 458 N.E.2d 338, 338 (1984). 
27 Crane Service, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 669, 496 N.E.2d at 835. 
28 291 Mass. 445, 448-49, 197 N.E. 75, 78 (1935). 
29 Crane Service, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 670, 496 N.E.2d at 836. 
30 Id. The matter on appeal in Crane Service was an action to reach and apply the 
proceeds of USF&G's insurance policy to satisfy a judgment which Crane had obtained 
against the general contractor, Caputo. Id. at 667 n.2, 496 N.E.2d at 833 n.2. 
§ 13.7 1 22 Mass. App. Ct. 407, 494 N.E.2d 45 (1986). 
2 In insurance parlance, the term "surplus line" refers to amounts of coverage which 
exceed the insurance capacity of licensed (so-called "admitted") carriers. That portion of 
the desired coverage which exceeds the capacity of the admitted market is placed with a 
nonadmitted carrier known as a surplus line insurer. The term also refers to the type of 
coverage which no admitted carrier will write, and in this context it refers to a nonadmitted 
carrier willing to write the coverage. BROWN, NONADMITTED MARKETS, PROPERTY & 
LIABILITY INSURANCE HANDBOOK 1013 (1%5). In Massachusetts, insurance brokers hold-
ing "special brokers" licenses may procure insurance from unlicensed, foreign insurers 
("nonadmitted" carriers), approved by the Insurance Commissioner, upon filing an affidavit 
with the Commissioner which attests that three licensed carriers refused to write the risk. 
G.L. c. 175, § 168. 
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ports with the reasonable expectations of a purchaser of that insurance. 3 
The court applied the time honored rule that where a policy contains an 
ambiguity, the court will construe the language against the insurer. 4 The 
court commented on the rationale for the payment of interest on policy 
proceeds owed but unpaid by an insurer. 5 
In Church of Christ in Lexington, the church obtained $800,000 of fire 
insurance from St. Paul Surplus Line Insurance company (St. Paul) on a 
building in Boston.6 The defendant's manuscript policy included the fol-
lowing provision: 
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY: If property covered hereunder 
is located in a state or province that requires a Standard Fire Insurance 
Policy at variance with this [p]olicy, then this [p]olicy shall cover such 
property in accordance with the provisions of such required Standard Fire 
Insurance Policy. 7 
Massachusetts, like most states, requires that companies incorporated 
or licensed to write fire insurance in this state use the standard fire policy 
set forth in chapter 175, section 99 when insuring property or interests 
in the Commonwealth. 8 The Appeals Court, ignoring the question of 
whether the policy of the church here at issue was required to be written 
using the language of the Massachusetts standard fire policy,9 merely held 
that Massachusetts is "a state that requires" under some circumstances 
the use of such statutory language. 10 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that St. Paul had voluntarily bound itself under the quoted contractual 
provision to permit the Massachusetts statutory policy to control. 11 
3 Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 411, 494 N.E.2d at 47. See 
generally, 2 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2o § 15:16 (Rhodes Rev. 1984). 
4 Bates v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 824, 370 N.E.2d 
1386, 1387-88 (1978); Morin v. Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc., 365 Mass. 379, 390, 31l 
N.E.2d 914, 924 (1974); Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 351 
Mass. !l3, ll9-20, 218 N.E.2d 64, 68 (1966); KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT§ 6.3 
(West 1971) cited in Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 410, 494 N.E.2d 
47. 
5 Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 411-12, 494 N .E.2d at 48. 
6 /d. at 408, 494 N.E.2d at 46. 
7 /d. at 409, 494 N.E.2d at 47. Had this provision not been in St. Paul's surplus line fire 
policy, there might be a constitutional question whether the Massachusetts legislature could 
regulate a nonadmitted foreign company "to the extent of imposing the required standard 
form on a contract entered into outside of Massachusetts." /d. at 41l, 494 N.E.2d at 48 
(citing Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 Mass. 407 (1902); Stone v. Old Colony St. 
Ry., 212 Mass. 459 (1912); Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 98 (1937); State Board oflns. 
v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962); Tisdale v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 148 
Ind. 670, 673 (1971)). 
8 /d. at 409-10, 494 N.E.2d at 47. 
9 /d. at 410-ll, 494 N.E.2d at 47-48. 
10 /d. at 410, 494 N.E.2d at 47. 
11 /d. at 410-ll, 494 N.E.2d at 47-48. 
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When the insured building sustained fire damage in 1982, the parties 
were unable to agree upon the amount of the loss. 12 The St. Paul policy 
and the Massachusetts standard policy differed as to the precise proce-
dure through which the parties were to adjust the loss and resolve that 
dispute, 13 although the purpose of both procedures was the same: to 
settle the disputed amount of the loss. 14 The Massachusetts standard fire 
policy requires a reference procedure, and the St. Paul policy called for 
an appraisal procedure. 15 
Despite such technical differences - which are more matters of no-
menclature than substance - the parties agreed to submit their dispute 
regarding the amount of the loss to three "referees. "16 Massachusetts law 
explicitly provides that an insurer joining in reference proceedings does 
not waive any legal defenses to the claim. 17 Furthermore, the law pro-
vides that absent the parties' specific agreement, the duty of referees is 
to ascertain only the actual cash value of the damaged property and the 
amount of loss sustained by the insured, 18 and to reduce such award to 
writing. 19 The referees in this case, however, went beyond this legal 
mandate. They purported to make a legal ruling at the outset that the 
proceedings were governed by the Massachusetts standard fire policy. 20 
Then, after determining that the church had sustained a loss of $800,000 
- the full face amount of the policy - the referees proceeded to issue 
an award for that amount, plus interest purportedly calculated at one 
percent over the prime rate. 21 
The court approached the issue of whether the Massachusetts standard 
fire policy applied using a reasonable person standard. That is, it consid-
ered how a reasonable purchaser of insurance would construe the lan-
guage employed in the St. Paul policy.22 As a non-admitted surplus lines 
insurer, St. Paul had alternatives in its choice of language in order not to 
bind itself so firmly to the various laws in the different states.23 The court 
pointed out that St. Paul's policy could have provided that it would be 
controlled by the laws of a given state only if its nonconforming policy 
12 /d. at 409, 494 N.E.2d at 47. 
13 Id. 
14Jd. 
15Jd. 
16 /d. The term "referees" connotes a proceeding in conformity with G.L. c. 175, §§ 100-
101H. 
17 G.L. C; 175, § tOlE. 
18 /d. See also G.L. c. 175, § 1010 
19 G.L. c. 175, § lOlA. 
2° Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 409,494 N.E.2d at 47. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 411, 494 N.E.2d at 48. 
23 /d. at 410-11, 494 N.E.2d at 47-48. See supra note 2. 
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could not lawfully be executed in such state. 24 The insurer did not do so 
in this instance. The court held that a reasonable purchaser of insurance 
would be likely to know that Massachusetts had a required standard fire 
policy, and would assume that the standard policy provisions would 
govem.25 
As a general matter, it is sound and reasonable for courts to hold 
parties to the express words which appear in a contract that they enter 
into voluntarily. 26 This is particularly true with a manuscript insurance 
policy where, as in St. Paul's case, the insurer is also the drafter of the 
policyY Such a carrier has control over the language which is used in 
the policy and must be held to its responsibility as set forth in the policy. 28 
Mter holding that the Massachusetts standard fire policy was the ap-
plicable policy in this case, the court discussed a unique aspect of the 
Massachusetts standard fire policy. 29 The St. Paul policy differed from 
the Massachusetts standard fire insurance policy in that it only required 
the insurer to pay interest on the amount of a Joss if payment of that 
amount was not tendered to the insured within sixty days after the amount 
of loss was agreed upon by the parties, or otherwise awarded to the 
insured. 30 The St. Paul policy permitted the insurance carrier to delay 
paying a claim for sixty days after an agreement on the amount of the 
loss had been reached between the parties and the appropriate paperwork 
completedY Interest accrued, as the carrier interpreted this provision, 
only from the date of the award. 32 
In contrast, the Massachusetts standard fire policy requires a property 
insurer to pay interest on the agreed amount of a loss commencing from 
a different point in time. 33 Section 99 of chapter 175 provides in pertinent 
part: 
24 /d. ~t 411, 494 N.E.2d at 48. 
25 /d. (citing Slater v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 379 Mass. 801, 803, 400 NcE.2d 
1256, 1258 (1980)). 
26 Newton Housing Auth. v. Cumberland Constr. Co., Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 358 
N.E.2d 474 (1977); Cape Cod Gas Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 3 Mass. App. 
Ct. 258, 327 N.E.2d 748 (1975); Shuman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 350 Mass. 254,214 
N.E.2d 76 (1966); M. Ahem Co. v. John Bowen Co., Inc., 334 Mass. 36, 133 N.E.2d 484 
(1956). 
27 See generally cases cited supra note 26. 
28 Kirkpatrick v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 393 Mass. 640, 473 N.E.2d 173 (1985); 
Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 384 Mass. 171, 424 N.E.2d 234 (1981); Tran-
samerica Ins. Co. v. Norfolk and Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 361 Mass. 144, 279 N.E.2d 
686 (1972); Lustenberger v. Boston Casualty Co., 300 Mass. 130, 14 N.E.2d 148 (1938); 
Edward Rose Co. v. Globe! Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 469, 160 N.E. 306 (1928). 
29 Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 411, 494 N .E.2d at 48. 
30 /d. 
31 /d. at 409, 494 N.E.2d at 47. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. 
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The company shall be liable for the payment of interest to the insured at a 
rate of one percent over the prime interest rate on the agreed figure comm-
encing thirty days after the date an executed proof of loss for such figure 
is received by the company, said interest to continue so long as the claim 
remains unpaid. 34 
There is uncertainty as to when under that statute the interest begins 
to accrue. 35 Two recent decisions applying Massachusetts law, Trempe 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 36 and United States v. Raphelson37 have 
increased the confusion in this area. 38 These decisions construed section 
9939 and section 10240 of chapter 175 as causing such excess of prime 
interest to run from 30 days after a company's receipt of an executed 
proof of loss or, in situations where the company sends an adjuster out 
to investigate a loss but fails to request forthwith that the insured submit 
a sworn proof of loss from 30 days after the date the company receives 
notice of loss,41 even though in neither case is there an agreement as to 
the amount of loss until much later. 42 
The Trempe and Raphelson courts misconstrued the wording of the 
statute43 which provides for payment of interest "on the agreed figure 
commencing 30 days after the date an executed proof of loss for such 
figure is received by the company .... "44 The reasoning found in Trempe 
and Raphelson is fundamentally flawed on this point. The courts in these 
cases ignored the phrase "for such figure" which immediately follows the 
phrase "an executed proof of loss"45 in that sentence of section 99. 
The conduct of the Massachusetts courts that is evidenced by these 
decisions is consistent with what may be a national trend. Although 
different jurisdictions have enacted different versions of either the stan-
dard New York fire insurance policy,46 or their own variant of such a 
statute as section 99,47 decisions in this area tend to focus upon the broad 
34 G.L. c. 175, § 99, Clause Twelfth, para. 18, as amended through St. 1973, c. 1064. 
35 Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 411-12, 494 N.E.2d at 48. 
36 20 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 480 N.E.2d 670 (1985). 
37 802 F. 2d 588 (I st Cir. 1986). 
38 Trempe, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 458, 480 N.E.2d at 676-77; Raphe/son, 802 F.2d at 593. 
39 G.L. c. 175, § 99, Clause Twelfth, para. 18, as amended through St. 1973, c. 1064. 
40 G.L. c. 175, § 102, para. I, as amended through St. 1934, c. 110 § 1. 
41 Trempe, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 459, 480 N.E.2d at 677; Raphe/son, 802 F.2d at 593. 
42 /d. 
43 G.L. c. 175, § 99, Clause Twelfth, para. 18, as amended through St. 1973, c. 1064. 
44 /d. (emphasis added). 
45 Trempe, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 459, 480 N.E.2d at 677. 
46 R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW - BASIC TEXT 70 (1971). See In-Towne Restaurant 
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 534, 540-41, 402 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 
(1980). 
47 G.L. c. 175, § 99 Clause Twelfth, para. 18, as amended through St. 1973, c. 1064. 
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public policy of what is perceived by the courts of the several states as 
"fairness. "48 As stated by the Church of Christ Court: 
Interest could be a matter of considerable concern to a person or an 
institution buying a policy of fire insurance on a major piece of property. 
The Massachusetts requirement adds an element of fairness to the contract 
from the point of view of the insured, as it provides that interest be paid 
for any period during which the company has the use of money which 
should have been at the disposal of the insured. The provision is also 
advantageous to the insured in that it discourages delay in settling claims 
by providing an incentive to the company to settle early.49 
It is difficult to reconcile the Trempe, Raphaelson and Church of Christ 
decisions in a fashion that clearly enunciates a course of conduct that 
must be undertaken by insurers in this Commonwealth. 
§ 13.8. Waiver of Subrogation Clause - "All Risk" Policy - AlA Form 
Construction Contract. In Haemonetics Corp. v. Brophy & Phillips Co., 
Inc., 1 the Appeals Court held that an insurer that insures an owner for 
the construction of a building under an "all risk" builders risk policy will 
not be allowed subrogation rights if the owner waives such rights in a 
subsequent contract with the general contractor. 2 Under equitable prin-
ciples of subrogation, an insurer steps into the shoes of an insured that 
it compensates. While the insurer may be indemnified by any third-party 
against whom that insured has a cause of action for the damages paid for 
by such insurer, in pursuing subrogation the insurer will be bound by 
contractual language to which the insured had freely consented before 
the loss occurred. 3 
The plaintiff in Haemonetics Corp. owned and occupied a building in 
Braintree, Massachusetts4 used in Haemonetics' business of manufactur-
ing and selling medical products.5 In 1980, the plaintiff entered into a 
contract with the defendant, Brophy & Phillips Company, Inc., for the 
construction on a mezzanine within the building.6 Brophy & Phillips, as 
general contractor, engaged a subcontractor, A & C Steel Erectors, Inc., 
to construct the steel part of the work. 7 While employees of A & C Steel 
were engaged in electric arc welding at the building, a fire occurred which 
48 Church of Christ in Lexington, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 411,494 N.E.2d at 48. 
49 /d. 
§ 13.8 1 23 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 501 N.E.2d 524 (1986). 
2 /d. at 255, 501 N.E.2d at 525. 
3 See 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 61:1 (Rhodes Rev. 1982). 
4 Haemonetics Corp., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 254, 501 N.E.2d at 524. 
5 /d. at 254-55, 501 N.E.2d at 524-25. 
6 Id. at 255, 501 N.E.2d at 525. 
7 /d. 
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caused damage to Haemonetics' property.8 Haemonetics was compen-
sated for its loss by its "all risk" insurance policy.9 The insurance carrier 
then exercised its contractual subrogation rights, and filed the instant suit 
in the name of Haemonetics against the contractor and the subcontractor 
alleging negligence and seeking recovery based upon damage to the prop-
erty.10 
This case revolves around the interplay between Haemonetics' insur-
ance contract and its construction contract with the general contractor. 
Haemonetics' insurance policy included a specific provision regarding 
the waiver of subrogation rights for losses caused by the fire. 11 The 
construction contract between Haemonetics and the general contractor 
was based upon the 1977 edition of the American Institute of Architects 
(AlA) standard form contract. Article 11.3 of the standard construction 
contract provided in pertinent part: 
§ 11.3.1 Unless otherwise provided, the owner shall purchase and maintain 
property insurance upon the entire work at the site to the full insurable 
value thereof. This insurance shall include the interests of the owner, the 
contractor, the subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors in the work and 
shall insure against the perils of fire and extended coverage and shall include 
"all risk" insurance for physical loss or damage including, without dupli-
cation of coverage, theft, vandalism and malicious mischief. 
§ 11.3.6 The owner and contractor waive all rights against (1) each other 
and the subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, agents and employees each of 
the other . . . for damages caused by fire or other perils to the extent 
covered by insurance obtained pursuant to this Paragraph 11.3 or any other 
property insurance applicable to the work .... 12 
The Appeals Court held that the fire damage sustained by Haemonetics 
in the course of the construction was not damage to the "work" within 
the meaning of the waiver of subrogation clause of the construction 
contract. 13 The standard AlA form contract defined "work" to include 
"the completed construction required by the Contract Documents, ... 
all labor necessary to produce such construction, and all materials and 
equipment incorporated or to be incorporated in such construction. " 14 
"Work" was also specifically defined by Haemonetics' contract with 
Brophy & Phillips as the erection of the building mezzanine. 
"!d. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
II Id. 
12 Id. at 255-56, 501 N.E.2d at 525. See also Tokio Marine and Fire Ins. v. Employers 
Ins. of Wausau, 786 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1986). 
13 Haemonetics Corp., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 256, 501 N.E.2d at 525. 
14 ld. See also E.C. Long, Inc. v. Brennan's of Atlanta, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 796, 252 
S.E.2d 642 (1978). 
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The cause of the fire was hot slag generated by one of the subcontrac-
tor's arc welding machines which fell onto a tarpaulin strung under the 
construction site. 15 The sprinkler system was activated and the resultant 
fire, smoke, and water damaged Haemonetics' equipment located under 
the construction area. Inasmuch as the fire damaged equipment and 
property of the owner - not property of Haemonet,ics' which was related 
to the erection of the mezzanine - th~ court reasoned that the damage 
therefore was not includ<;d in the construction contract's definition of 
"work." Alternatively, the court held that even if such damage was to 
the "work," Haemonetics' contract with the general contractor waived, 
probably as an incentive for the general contractor to agree to do the 
"work" in the first place, any subrogation rights that Haernonetics' in-
surer may attempt to assert. 16 
Construction contracts typically have a clause regarding the procure-
ment of insurance to cover property which might be damaged or de-
stroyed in the course of the construction. 17 In this case, Haemonetics' 
construction contract required it to secure a policy which provided cov-
erage for the entire property and all interests ofthe·owner, the contractor, 
subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors. The waiver of subrogation lan-
guage in section 11.3 of the AlA form contract used by Haemonetics, 
the court held, effectively waived subrogation rights of Haemonetics' 
insurer under any insurance policy provided to satisfy the broad section 
11.3 coverage requirements. 18 
The p1,1rpose of a waiver of subrogation clause, such as that in section 
11.3 of Haemonetics' contract, is to avoid disruption of the construction 
work due to a dispute over the party responsible for property damage 
which might occur: 19 "[i]t eliminates the need for lawsuits, and yet pro-
tects the contracting parties from loss by bringing all property damage 
under the all risk builder's property insurance."20 In this case,Haemo-
15 Haemonetics Corp., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 255 n.2, 501 N.E.2d at 525 n.2. 
16 Id. See also Tokio Marine and Fire Ins. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 786 F.2d 101 
(2d Cir. 1986) (The construction contract between the owner of the project and the general 
contractor wa,s based upon the same AlA provision. The language was held to constitute 
a waiver of S!lbrogation rights). 
17 Tokio Marine, 786 F.2d at 104. 
18 Id. Haemonetics Corp., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 257, 501 N.E.2d at 526; cf. Trump-
Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. H.R.M. Constr. Corp., 106 A.D.2d 242, 485 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1985) 
(with almost identical facts to the present case, the court held that the insurer could not 
exercise subrogation rights against a subcontractor). 
19 Haemonetics Corp., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 258, 501 N.E.2d at 526; see also Firtin v. 
Nebel Heating Corp., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 1006 (1981) (the language in§§ 11.3.1 and 
11.3.6 of the AlA form must be construed as providing mutual exculpation to bargaining 
parties, who agreed in the event of loss to look solely to the insurance and not each other 
for indemnity). 
20 Haemonetics Corp., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 258, 501 N.E.2d at 526. 
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netics' insurer drafted the policy which made specific reference to the 
possibility of such a waiver of subrogation rights by Haemonetics when 
contracting with the general contractor. 21 The insurer likely was well 
aware, given the inclusion of waiver of subrogation provisions in the 
AlA standard forms of construction contract, that property owners com-
monly are required to waive subrogation rights in construction con-
tracts.22 For these reasons, the court upheld the waiver clause and re-
jected the subrogation claim by Haemonetics' insurer. 23 
§ 13.9. "Stacking"- Distinction Between Mandatory and Optional Cov-
erages - Underinsured Motorist Coverage - "Regular Use" Exclusion. 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court rendered opinions 
in two cases which involved uninsured motorist coverage. The coverage 
is now a mandatory part of the standard Massachusetts automobile policy 
and includes what formerly was optional "under-insured" coverage. 1 Both 
cases, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company v. DeCenzo2 and Man-
ning v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Companies, 3 built on the 
Court's analysis of the cognate statute, chapter 175, section 113L, in the 
seminal 1985 decision of Cardin v. Royal Insurance Company of Amer-
ica.4 These three decisions are so important developmentally that they 
must be studied and understood as a trilogy. 
The issue in Cardin was whether the "regular use" exclusion contained 
in the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage contravened the legislative 
intent of chapter 175, section 113L.5 The plaintiff in Cardin had been 
injured while a passenger in a car owned by her husband.6 Although she 
received the maximum amount under the liability provisions of her hus-
band's policy/ it was insufficient to compensate Cardin fully for her 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 ld. 
§ 13.9 I G.L. c. 175, § 113L. 
2 396 Mass. 692, 488 N.E.2d 405 (1986), aff'g 18 Mass. App. Ct. 973, 469 N.E.2d 1316 
(1984). The authors' law firm represented the plaintiff, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty 
Company. 
3 397 Mass. 38, 489 N.E.2d 700 (1986). 
4 394 Mass. 450, 476 N.E.2d 200 (1985). 
'ld. at 450, 476 N.E.2d at 201. 
6 ld. at 451, 476 N.E.2d at 202. The plaintiff's husband was operating the car at the time 
of the accident. /d. 
7 ld. Cardin's husband's car was insured by Royal Insurance Company. Jd. His policy 
afforded coverage for bodily injury if the policyholder was legally responsible for the 
accident. I d. Because this provision did not fully compensate the plaintiff, Cardin's husband 
was regarded as underinsured. ld. at 451 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 202 n.2. As a result, the 
provision of the policy concerning injury caused by an underinsured automobile was also 
applicable to the plaintiff. ld. at 451, 476 N.E.2d at 202. 
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injuries.8 Cardin, therefore, sought coverage from her own insurer under 
the uninsured motorist coverage provision of a policy covering a car she 
owned.9 Cardin's insurer refused to pay under this provision, relying on 
the policy's regular use exclusion. That exclusion required that a pre-
mium be paid as a predicate to underinsured motorist coverage for an 
injury sustained by an occupant in an automobile owned or regularly 
used by the insured or a member of his or her household. 10 Although 
Cardin had not paid the premium required for such coverage upon her 
husband's car,u the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that any such 
exclusion to uninsured motorist coverage contravened the legislative 
purpose behind chapter 175, section 113L, and consequently, was inva-
lid.l2 
The Cardin Court distinguished uninsured motorist coverage from au-
tomobile liability insurance. Uninsured motorist coverage is not limited 
to incidents arising from use ofan insured's own automobile. 13 Rather, 
it applies regardless of where a person is injured; 14 in effect, it is limited 
personal accident insurance chiefly for the benefit of the named insured. 15 
Because the uninsured motorist coverage statute, as enacted by the 
legislature, required compulsory coverage, the Court in Cardin concluded 
that exclusionary language in the policy was invalid, despite the promul-
gation and approval of that language by the Commissioner of Insurance. 16 
Not only did the statute explicitly require every insurance policy to 
contain uninsured motorist coverage, 17 but the legislature also placed a 
8 Id. at 451, 476 N.E.2d at 202. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. The plaintiff asserted that this provision was contrary to the legislative purpose 
underlying G.L. c. 175, § 1l3L. /d. at 452, 476 N.E.2d at 202. Secondly, the plaintiff argued 
that "the exclusion fails to serve the purpose for which it was intended and that it deprives 
her of the substantial economic value of her policy while conferring an unfair benefit on 
the defendant." Id. 
12 Id. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 453, 476 N.E.2d at 203. Generally, if the language of an insurance policy is 
unambiguous, the plain meaning of the language will prevail. Id. The Court recognized, 
however, that because of the mandatory nature of the statute, the insurance policy was not 
an ordinary contract. /d. Therefore, "[t]he well-settled principles covering the interpretation 
of an ordinary policy of insurance have been properly disregarded in determining the scope 
and extent of a compulsory motor vehicle policy in order to accomplish the legislative aim 
of providing compensation to those who have been injured by automobiles." I d. at 454, 
476 N.E.2d at 203 (citing Desmarais v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 331 Mass. 199, 202, 
liS N.E.2d 86 (1954)). 
17 Id. at 455, 476 N.E.2d at 204. By virtue of enactment of G.L. c. 175, § 1l3L(2) by St. 
1980, c. 532 § 2, "uninsured motorist" coverage now includes "underinsured motorist" 
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few explicit conditions upon such coverage, requiring "that the insured 
be legally entitled to recover damages, that the tortfeasor be uninsured 
or underinsured, and that payment not exceed th~ monetary limit of the 
insured's policy. "18 The Court reasoned that inasmuch as these were the 
only limitations sanctioned by the legislature, any other exclusions or 
exceptions would be contrary to the legislative purpose. 19 In so doing, 
the Col)rt recogni;z:ed that its determination would frustrate insurers' 
efforts to prevent "stacking" of uninsured motorists coverage, but noted 
that the legislative policy allowed no other course. 20 
The policyholder in DeCenzo principally relied on Cardin to support 
his position that Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company (Lumber-
men's) was precluded from denying coverage on the basis of an "anti-
stacking" provision in the Massachusetts automobile policy. 21 In De-
Cenzo, the defendant's son was killed in an automobile accident. 22 The 
automobile in which he was a passenger was uninsured. 23 The defendant's 
family owned three cars, each separately insured by Lumbermen's. 24 
DeCenzo requested payment of the total amount of the underinsurance 
benefits specified in the three policies,25 each of which contained an "anti-
st<~,cking" provision.26 On the basis of those provisions, Lumbermen's 
refused to pay the total amount demanded, but instead offered DeCenzo 
the maximum amount spe~ified in any one policy. 27 To resolve the cov-
erage dispute, Lumbermen's sought declaratory relief against DeCenzo 
individually and as administrator of his son's estate. The superior court 
ruled that Lumbermen's was liable only to the maximum amount on any 
one policy.28 The Appeals Court affirmed that decision which was sub-
coverage. fd. at 450 n.1, 476 N.E.2d at 201 n.l. Also see Manning, 397 Mass. at 42 n.4, 
489 N.E.2d at 702 n.4. 
18 Cardin, 394 Mass. at 455, 476 N.E.2d at 204. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 456-57, 476 N.E.2d at 204-05. 
21 Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty v. DeCenzo, 396 Mass. 692, 694, 488 N.E.2d 405, 406-
07 (1986). 
22 /d. at 693, 488 N.E.2d at 406. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. The policies contained optional underinsurance coverage applicable to both the 
insured and members of his/her household. /d. Separate premium payments were required 
for such coverage, which the plaintiff had paid. /d. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. The "anti-stacking" language in the 1978 version of the Massachusetts automobile 
policy, which was in force at the time of DeCenzo's accident, provided, "[s]ometimes two 
or more auto policies cover the same accident. If all the policies are with us, the most we 
will ordinarily pay is the highest dollar limit on any one policy .... " /d. 
27 /d. 
28 /d. at 692-93, 488 N.E.2d at 406-07. 
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sequently considered by the Supreme Judicial Court on DeCe11zo's ap-
plication for further appellate review. 29 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Appeals Court decision. 30 
The plaintiff argued that the "anti-stacking" provisions were contrary to 
chapter 175, section 113L.31 The DeCenzo Court, however, refused to 
apply the Cardin holding because the statute in force when DeCenzo's 
son was killed differed from the statute discussed in Cardin. 32 The word-
ing of chapter 175, section 113L construed in Cardin had been adopted 
subsequent to the accident in DeCenzo,33 and it was the amended statute 
which the Court found indicative of a legislative intent to preclude limi-
tations on underinsured motorist coverage. 34 The Court perceived no 
such intent in the previous version ofthe statute in force when DeCenzo's 
son was killed. 35 Most significantly, the amended statute upon which the 
Cardin Court relied converted underinsured motorist coverage from an 
optional to a mandatory coverage; under the prior version, the coverage 
was optional. 36 By virtue of the 1981 amendment, "uninsured motor 
vehi~le coverage" was broadened to encompass underinsured coverageY 
Moreover, between DeCenzo's 1978 accident and Cardin's 1983 injury, 
the minimum amount of underinsured motorist coverage which insurers 
in Massachusetts were required to offer for sale had been increased 
substantially by the legislature. 38 
In Marming, the Court determined that the legislative policy of chapter 
175, section 113L was not contravened by prohibiting an automobile 
accident victim from recovering the benefits of the tortfeasor's underin-
sured motorist coverage.39 The plaintiff victim was injured when the 
tortfeasor's automobile collided with the car Manning was driving. 40 After 
recovering under his underinsured motorist coverage, as well as under 
the tortfeasor's bodily injury policy, the plaintiff sought recovery from 
29 Id. at 692, 488 N.E.2d at 406. 
30 ld. 
31 /d. 
32 Id. at 694, 488 N.E.2d at 407. 
33Jd. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 695, 488 N.E.2d at 407. 
36 /d. at 694, 488 N.E.2d at 407. 
37 ld. 
38 /d. Under the earlier version, insurers were not required to exceed $5,000/person or 
$10,000/accident in underinsured motorist coverage options. ld. at 695, 488 N.E.2d at 407. 
In 1983, the amounts were increased to $15,000/person and $40,000/accident. ld. at 694-
95, 488 N.E.2d at 407. 
39 Manning v. Firemen's Fund American Ins. Co., 397 Mass. 38, 42,489 N.E.2d 700,702 
(1986). The victim recovered the limit of available funds. !d. at 39, 489 N.E.2d at 701. 
40 ld. 
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the tortfeasor's underinsured coverage.41 Manning argued that such re-
covery was required under the "fair meaning" of the tortfeasor's policy, 
and within the legislative intent of chapter 175, section 113L.42 
Relying on Cardin, the Court found the plaintiff's interpretation un-
reasonable because of the distinction emphasized in Cardin between 
underinsured coverage and liability insurance.43 If the plaintiff's inter-
pretation were given effect, this distinction would cease to exist.44 Fur-
thermore, the Court found the language of the tortfeasor's policy unam-
biguous,45 which further supported the Court's finding that the legislative 
intent of chapter 175, section 113L was not violated46 by a prohibition of 
"stacking" in this instance. Although chapter 175, section 113L required 
underinsured motorist coverage, the Court observed that the intent of 
that statute was not to create additional liability insurance.47 
Both the DeCenzo and Manning opinions are based upon sound rea-
soning. The DeCenzo Court's decision is consistent with previous hold-
ings.48 In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Schultz49 - which involved an 
accident occurring in 1978 when the applicable statute was the same as 
that in DeCenzo50 - the Supreme Judicial Court had enforced a similar 
exclusion. 51 Moreover, in Royal Indemnity Co. v. Blakely,52 which in-
volved an accident occurring in 197353 - the Court similarly had held 
that an anti-stacking provision was not contrary to the legislative purpose 
of chapter 17 5, section 113 L. 
41 /d. 
42Jd. 
43 /d. at 41, 489 N.E.2d at 701-02. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the distinction between underinsured and liability coverage. 
44 Manning, 397 Mass. at 41, 489 N.E.2d at 701-02. 
45 /d. at 41, 489 N.E.2d at 702. 
46 /d. at 42, 489 N.E.2d at 702. 
47 !d. 
48 See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
49 385 Mass. 1013, 1014, 434 N.E.2d 213, 214 (1982). The Court first determined whether 
a moped was within the meaning of the term "land motor vehicle." /d. at 1013, 434 N.E.2d 
at 213. Once the Court concluded that it was, the accident victim was precluded from 
recovering because he did not pay additional premiums./d. at 1013-14, 434 N.E.2d at 213-
14. Also see§ 13.10, infra, notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
50 Royal Globe, 385 Mass. at 1013-14, 434 N.E.2d at 213-14. 
5I /d. 
52 372 Mass. 86, 87, 360 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1977). 
53 /d. at 86, 360 N.E.2d at 865. The plaintiff in Royal was struck by an automobile while 
driving his father's car. ld. at 87, 360 N.E.2d at 865. When the accident occurred, he lived 
with his parents. Id. Both parents had insurance on each of their cars, and the plaintiff 
wanted to stack three policies. /d. The insurance company limited plaintiff's recovery to 
his own policy, based upon anti-stacking language in that policy. /d. As noted by Cardin, 
394 Mass. at 456, 476 N.E.2d at 205, the statute construed in Royal was an earlier version 
of G.L. c. 175, § 113L. 
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The DeCenzo Court was also correct in its interpretation of the legis-
lative purpose behind the various versions of chapter 17 5, section 113 L. 54 
The Cardin decision made explicit reference to the broadened purpose 
behind the 1981 amendments to the statute55 there at issue, and in that 
light the DeCenzo decision was predictable. 
The Manning opinion likewise reflects the rationale applied by the 
Cardin Court. Both cases construed the same version of chapter 175, 
section 113L.56 Cardin held that the statutory language and underlying 
legislative purpose invalidate exclusions to mandatory uninsured motorist 
coverage as it now exists in Massachusetts,57 and Manning permitted 
prohibitions on "stacking" uninsured motorist coverage with liability cov-
erages.58 . 
§ 13.10. Stacking of Coverages- Medical Payments Coverage of Per-
sonal Auto Policy - "Regular Use" Exclusion. The issue before the Court 
in Thomas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 1 was whether 
the plaintiff was entitled to recover medical expenses under the standard 
Massachusetts personal automobile insurance policy for injuries arising 
from an accident which occurred while the plaintiff was operating his 
spouse's automobile. 2 The plaintiff and his wife were separately insured 
by Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford), each for their 
own automobile. 3 Both policies included Part 6, optional medical pay-
ments coverage with a $5000 limit of liability, 4 but each policy listed only 
the particular owner and his or her automobile. 5 
Hartford paid $5000 for plaintiff's medical expenses as required by the 
terms of his wife's policy covering the car involved in the accident.6 
Although plaintiff's medical bills far exceeded that amount, Hartford 
refused payment under the medical payments coverage in the plaintiff's 
own policy.7 Hartford's refusal was based upon the so-called "regular 
use" exclusion of the standard Massachusetts personal auto policy, which 
provides that there is no coverage for medical expenses resulting from 
injuries which occur while one occupies or is struck by an automobile 
54 Cardin, 394 Mass. at 453, 476 N.E.2d at 203. 
"Id. at 454 n.5, 476 N.E.2d at 204 n.5. 
56 Manning, 397 Mass. at 39, 489 N.E.2d at 702. 
" See supra notes 5-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the holding in Cardin. 
58 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for the facts of Manning. 
§ 13.10 1 398 Mass. 782, 500 N.E.2d 810 (1986). 
2 Id. at 782, 500 N.E.2d at 811. 
3 I d. at 783, 500 N .E.2d at 811. 
4 I d. This coverage required an additional $6.00 premium which the plaintiff paid. I d. 
5 Id. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. 
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owned or regularly used by a named insured or a member of that poli-
cyholder's household, unless that automobile is shown on the policy's 
Coverage Selection page as having a separate premium pa,ld for medical 
expenses cov~rage. 8 The plaintiff was not a listed operator of his wife's 
car, and plaint~ff 's policy did not reflect the additional premium necessary 
for medical ex.pense coverage for him under his wife's vehicle.9 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff asserted he was entitled to recovery because 
of an additional provision in part 6 of Hartford's policy. 10 That provision, 
in effect, provided that the insurer will not pay medical benefits for 
injuries resulting from an accident where the policyholder is operating a 
~ar which he does not own, until the owner's medical payment coverage 
is exceeded. 11 Because the plaintiff's medical expenses exce~ded the 
limit of his wife's policy, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to 
medical benefits under this provision of his own policy. 12 The Supreme 
Judicial Court, however, declined to so hold. 13 
Courts give exclusionary language its ordinary meaning. Where there 
is no aiQbiguity, the Court J;eiterated that it "will construe the terms of 
an exclusionary clause acc0rding to their ordinary meaning. "14 Applying 
this principle, the Court concluded that the plaintiff fell within the "reg-
ular use" exclusion and, therefore, the additional language relied upon 
by plaintiff was not applicable to extend coverage under his own policy. 15 
The Court concluded that the pl&intiff was expressly excluded from 
medical payments coverage by paragraph 5 of Part 6 of his policy, and 
thus was not "someone covered under this Part" within the meaning of 
8 /d. The so-called "regular use" exclusion is found in subparagraph 5 of Part 6 of the 
Massachusetts private passenger automobile policy, which states: 
/d. 
We will not pay for [medical] expenses resulting from injuries to: ... 5. Anyone 
injured while occupying or struck by an auto owned or regularly used by you or any 
household member unless a premium for this part is shown for that auto on the 
Coverage Selections page. 
• /d. at 784, 500 N.E.2d at 812. 
10 ld. 
11 /d. The plaintiff relied upon additional language in Part 6 of his own policy, as follows: 
lf someone covered under this Part is also entitled to medical payments coverage 
under another auto policy issued to you or any household member, we will pay only 
our proportionate share. If someone covered under this Part is using an auto he or 
she does not own at the same time of the accident, the owner's automobile medical 
payments insurance must pay its limits before we pay. Then, we will pay up to the 
limit shown on your Coverage Selections page for any expenses not covered by that 
insurance. 
12Jd. 
''/d. 
14 /d. (citing Royal-Globe Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 385 Mass. 1013, 434 N.E.2d 213 (1982)). 
"/d. 
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his own policy. 16 This conclusion, the Court. ruled, was consistent with 
Royal-Globe Ins. Co. v. SchultzP in which the Court had enforced 
virtually identical "regular use" exclusionary language. 18 The exclusion-
ary clause at issue in Schultz applied to optional underinsured motorist 
coverage, 19 which the Thomas Court did not find to be a significant 
distinction, given the virtl,l..ally identical nature of the exclusionary lan-
guage.2o 
The fact that the exclusion in Schultz involved underinsured motorist 
coverage rather than medical benefits coverage is irrelevant.21 The. prin-
ciple that courts should give language in insurance policies ordinary 
meaning, at least where no ambiguity is perceived to exist, is well estab-
lished in Massachusetts, and has been applied by the Court in cases 
involving exclusionary clauses22 as well as other types of insurance cov-
erage issues. 23 
§ 13.11. Intentional Destruction of Insured Property -Insured's Failure 
to Rebut evidence of lntentjoaai Destruction. Since the early p~;trt of this 
century, the MassachusE>ttS courts have held that in a civil;;tction, a fact 
finder may draw an inference against a party who fails to testify or offer 
evidence in its own behalf to controvert charges against it. During the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court specifically addressed this issue 
and confirmed the rule in McGinnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Company. 1 
16Jd. 
17 385 Mass. 1013, 434 N.E.2d 213 (1982). In Schultz, the defendant was il\jured while 
riding a moped. ld. Although the moped was not insured by Royal-Globe, that carrier did 
have a policy in force covering the defendant's automobile, anq the claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits was brought under that policy. Id. 
18 /d, at 1013-14, 434 N.E.2d at 213-14. The clause provided that ''the insurer will not 
pay benefits for '[a]nyone injured while occupying ... an auto owned or regularly used 
by [the insured] ... unless a premium for this part is shown for that auto on the Coverage 
Selections page' (emphasis added)." ld. 
19 ld. At the present time, underinsured motorists coverage is no longer optional and is 
afforded, together with uninsured motorists coverage, in Part 3 of the standard Massachu-
setts private passenger motor vehicle policy. 
20 Thomas, 398 Mass. 784, 434 N.E.2d at 213. 
ZIJd. 
22 Manning v. Fireman's Fund America Ins. Co., 397 Mass. 38, 40, 4,89 N.E.2d 700, 702 
(1986) (citing Cardin v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 450, 453-54, 476 N.E.2d 200, 201 
(1985)). 
23 See, e.g., Bilodeau v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 392 Mass. 537,541,467 N.E.2d 
137, 140 (1984) (citing Save-mor Supermarkets, Inc. v. Skelly Detective Serv., Inc., 359 
Mass. 221, 226, 268 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1971), quoting Oakes v. Manufacturers' Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 131 Mass. 164, 166. (1881)), In Bilodeau, the Court applied this principle 
of ordinary interpretation in construing the meaning of the common policy term. "per 
person." ld. 
§ 13.11 1 398 Mass. 37, 494 N.E.2d 1322 (1986). 
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The plaintiff claimed that her automobile had been stolen.2 McGinnis' 
insurance policy provided coverage against theft, but not if she had 
intentionally procured the loss. 3 The police found the car destroyed by 
fire. 4 The factual issue at the trial was whether the plaintiff had inten-
tionally destroyed her car. The legal issue on appeal, however, was 
whether the trial judge appropriately could rule that an inference against 
the plaintiff could be drawn from her failure to testify specifically that 
she did not set fire to the car. 5 The Appeals Court reversed the judgment 
and ordered a new trial, holding that the judge improperly drew a con-
clusive inference against the plaintiff due to her failure to deny specifically 
the defendant's allegations. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Appeals Court and reinstated 
the trial court'sjudgment.7 The Court acknowledged the controlling prec-
edent of Richardson v. Travelers Fire Insurance Co.,8 which held that 
an insurer has the burden of proving its affirmative defense that the 
insured intentionally destroyed the covered property.9 In the Court's view 
the superior court had explicitly recognized this, and the Court approved 
what it considered to be the trial judge's common sense reasoning. 10 The 
burden of proof never shifted to the plaintiff because the defendant 
insurer presented a prima facie case that the plaintiff had engaged in 
criminal conduct relating to the destruction of the insured property.n 
Under these circumstances, it is practical and sensible for a fact finder 
to give weight to an insured's failure to dispute expressly an allegation 
of criminal conduct and the insurer's evidence establishing a prima facie 
case in support of such charge. 12 
Because the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to criminal 
2 /d. 
3 /d. Even apart from a specific policy exclusion for intentional loss, it is generally the 
case that an insured's willful destruction of property which is the subject matter of an 
insuring agreement will relieve the insurer from liability on account of that occurrence as 
a matter of public policy. See Osvaldo Varaine, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 362 
Mass. 853, 285 N.E.2d 451 (1972); Richardson v. Travelers Fire Insurance Co., 288 Mass. 
391, 19 N.E. 40 (1934); Todd v. Traders and Mutual Insurance Co., 230 Mass. 595, 120 
N.E. 142 (1918); 18 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D., § 74:663 (Rhodes Rev. 1983). 
4 /d. 
5 /d. 
6 /d. at 37-38, 494 N.E.2d at 1322-33, reversing, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 621-22, 481 
N.E.2d 1381 (1985). 
7 /d. at 38, 494 N.E.2d at 1323. 
8 288 Mass. 391, 193 N.E.2d 40 (1934). 
9 /d. at 393, 193 N.E.2d at 42. 
10 McGinnis, 398 Mass. at 38, 494 N.E.2d at 1323. 
11 /d. at 39, 494 N.E.2d at 1323. 
12 /d. at 38-39, 494 N.E.2d at 1323. 
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cases, silence in a civil case can amount to an admission. 13 In McGinnis, 
the plaintiff's silence was detrimental to her position. If she had not 
intentionally obtained the destruction of her car, common sense suggests 
that she would at least expressly deny such a charge against her. Inas-
much as the insurer had presented a prima facie case against McGinnis, 
the Court held that the trial judge plainly was warranted in considering, 
and even "in placing 'particular significance' on the plaintiff's failure to 
deny her complicity in the disappearance and destruction of her motor 
vehicle. " 14 
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court applied a line 
of cases dating back to the early part of this century. The McGinnis 
decision is significant for insurers, however, because it clarifies that an 
insurer may establish the affirmative defense of intentional destruction 
of insured property when an insured, confronted with a carrier's prima 
facie evidence of its involvement in the cause and origin of a loss, fails 
to take the stand and deny such complicity at trial. 
13 Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316, 134 N.E. 407, 423 (1922). 
14 McGinnis, 398 Mass. at 39, 494 N.E.2d at 1323. 
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